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INTRODUCTION
Today the business community may be witnessing only the
first wave of environmental and toxic tort liabilities. Govern-
ment studies report as many as 425,000 hazardous waste sites
around the country, in addition to the 1,200 sites currently on
the National Priority List.' This figure does not include an ad-
ditional 400,000 to 600,000 landfills and waste lagoons, as well
as nearly 1.5 million underground fuel storage tanks.2 Accord-
ing to estimates, fuel from approximately 375,000 storage
tanks has escaped and contaminated soil and ground water.'
Added to these risks are countless products and completed op-
erations incorporating allegedly hazardous substances, such as
asbestos. Bodily injury or property damage from these sub-
stances may not become manifest until years after initial
exposure.
These situations can give rise to a variety of claims alleging
bodily injury or property damage. Toxic tort claimants, for ex-
ample, typically seek damages for physical and mental injury
caused by the ingestion of or exposure to hazardous sub-
stances. Claimed damages might also include lifetime medical
monitoring due to an increased risk of cancer, and compensa-
tion for heightened fear of sickness and early death.
Claims for damage to private property might include the
cost of cleaning up contamination and restoring the property
to its original condition. The claimant may also seek damages
for diminution in property value if the property cannot be
completely restored. Further, government authorities may
pursue similar compensation for damage to property and natu-
ral resources in which the public has an interest.
Potential liabilities from these third party injury and damage
claims are staggering. Groundwater has been a source of
drinking water for one-half of the nation's population. A gov-
ernment report estimates that over forty-seven million persons
may have been exposed to toxic substances at the 2,500 most
hazardous waste sites. 4 Each claim associated with these expo-
1. Thomas, Hartford Outlines Pollution Alternative, NATIONAL UNDERWRITER-
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sures could give rise to millions of dollars in liability.5
In addition, governmental authorities can be expected to as-
sert an increasing number of claims against businesses for
damages resulting from contaminated property. The United
States Environmental Protection Agency estimates that dam-
ages associated with the 2,500 most hazardous waste sites may
range from $30 million to $50 million per site.6 Any business
that contributed waste at the site could be jointly and severally
liable for these damages.
Faced with these liabilities, many businesses have turned to
their insurance carriers for the financial protection which the
carriers promised to provide in exchange for substantial pre-
miums. The insurance industry's response, however, has been
less than exemplary. Rather than cooperate with policyholders
and other carriers, many carriers instead have chosen to en-
gage in protracted litigation, denying coverage on grounds
that often contradict the drafting intent and historical practices
of the insurance industry.7 As a result, the insurance industry
has been unable to develop a collective and more constructive
approach to meet its obligations.
I. SUMMARY
Standard liability and property insurance policies purchased
by businesses over the past decades afford coverage of the lia-
bilities and losses associated with environmental and toxic tort
claims. In particular:
* Standard comprehensive general liability (CGL) insur-
ance policies issued from approximately 1941 through
5. For example, in one toxic tort case, residents of a Missouri town were ex-
posed to a chemical spill reportedly containing less than one teaspoon of dioxin.
After three and a half years of costly litigation, the claimants were awarded $16 mil-
lion in damages for alleged headaches, fatigue and potential genetic damage. See id.
6. Id.
7. See e.g., In re Asbestos Ins. Coverage Cases, Judicial Council Coordination
Proceeding No. 1072 (Cal. Super. Ct., San Francisco County filed Jan. 24, 1990).
This case involved five policyholders, more than 70 carriers, and over 34,000 pages
of transcript testimony. Over a period of many years, the policyholders discovered
extensive evidence regarding the background and drafting history of the comprehen-
sive general liability policy. See also U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO
THE CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMM. ON POLICY RESEARCH AND INSURANCE, COMM. ON BANKING,
FINANCE AND URBAN AFFAIRS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HAZARDOUS WASTE: POL-
LUTION CLAIMS EXPERIENCE OF PROPERTY/CASUALITY INSURERS 4 (Feb. 1991) (report-
ing that thirteen major carriers are engaged in nearly 2,000 law suits with
policyholders over coverage for environmental liabilities).
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1985 should cover liabilities arising from any contamina-
tion-related bodily injury or property damage neither
expected nor intended from the standpoint of the
policyholder;
* Standard CGL policies issued since approximately 1986
should cover the same liabilities when the contamination
injury or damage arises from the policyholder's off-
premises products, completed operations or (in some
circumstances) ongoing operations, from non-environ-
mental and non-industrial contamination, or from
causes other than the discharge of pollutants;
* Standard "all risk" property insurance policies issued
prior to 1986 should cover the cost of removing con-
taminants from soil or water at or near the policy-
holder's premises when the contaminants are from
covered property (e.g., commercial grade chemicals in a
storage tank) which was lost into the soil or water be-
cause of a fortuitous event;
" Typical environmental impairment liability (EIL) insur-
ance policies should cover claims for damages and clean-
up costs incurred because of contamination injury or
damage occurring away from the policyholder's desig-
nated premises (sometimes including waste sites) as a re-
sult of conditions at the designated premises.
This article recommends that the insurance industry adopt a
constructive group approach toward settling its financial obli-
gations to policyholders. Otherwise, many insurance carriers
and their reinsurers face enormous potential liabilities.
II. COMPREHENSIVE GENERAL LIABILITY INSURANCE
COVERAGE
The purpose of CGL insurance is to protect the policyholder
from liabilities arising from claims of bodily injury or property
damage to third parties. The insurance industry developed
standard CGL coverage in the 1940s to cover all risks of third
party liability under one policy, rather than only specific risks
under various separate "schedule" policies.' The bedrock
principle underlying this new "comprehensive" coverage was,
and remains, that any and all risks of liability for third party
bodily injury or property damage are covered unless specifi-
8. Comprehensive Liability Program of National Bureau Makes Its Debut, CASUALTY AND
SURETY UNDERWRITER, Jan. 24, 1941, at 32.
[Vol. 17
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cally excluded in the policy.9
The blanket security provided by the CGL policy has been
used as a major selling point by the insurance industry over the
past decades. As early as 1941, a representative of Travelers
Indemnity Company advised sales agents to "[e]mphasize
'peace of mind' coverage, i.e., [the] feeling of security and
sense of protection that goes with Comprehensive Liability."' 0
The transaction between the CGL carrier and policyholder is
relatively straightforward. The policyholder agrees to pay a
premium calculated by the carrier's underwriter. The pre-
mium is based on the underwriter's thorough inspection and
assessment of the risks associated with the policyholder's oper-
ations and products. In exchange for the premium, the CGL
carrier agrees to bear the risk of liabilities arising from third
party injury and damage not specifically excluded in the policy.
The carrier's risk encompasses future changes in the law that
may redefine and expand theories of bodily injury or property
damage liability. Thus, the 1941 Travelers, "sales pointer" ex-
plained that "[c]omprehensive policies follow the Common
Law in a broader sense than individual policies. The
[c]ommon [f]aw deals with liabilities; specific [schedule] poli-
cies deal with hazards, hence the need for the broad inclusive
insuring clauses of the Comprehensive policies.""
The "broad inclusive insuring clauses" of the standard CGL
policy have not changed materially since the 1940s. 2 In ex-
change for a premium, the CGL carrier agrees to indemnify
the policyholder for all sums which the policyholder becomes
legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury or
property damage to which the insurance applies.'" The
claimed bodily injury or property damage must have happened
during the policy period and must have been caused by an oc-
currence.14 "Occurrence" means an accident, "including con-
9. Id.
10. Eglof, Comprehensive Liability Insurance-The Outside, BEST'S FIRE & CASUALTY
NEWS, May 1941, at 56 (available in William Mitchell Law Review office).
11. Id.
12. For language used in standard insurance policies from 1941 to the present,
see Appendices A-E.
13. Id.
14. Id. The 1986 "claims-made" CGL policy requires that the occurrence hap-
pen during the policy period or a specified "retroactive period" pre-dating issuance
of the policy. See Appendix E. Standard pre-1986 "occurrence" policies, however,
typically cover liabilities arising from bodily injury or property damage regardless of
1991]
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tinuous or repeated 'exposure to conditions, which results in
bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor in-
tended from the standpoint of the insured."' 5 The carrier also
agrees to defend any suit against the policyholder seeking
damages on account of such bodily injury or property
damage. 16
Over the past decades, the insurance industry has repeatedly
acknowledged that its basic insuring agreement covers liabili-
ties arising from pollution and hazardous substances. In the
mid-1960s, for example, a representative of Liberty Mutual In-
surance Company authored a widely-distributed paper discuss-
ing coverage under the standard 1966 CGL policy.' 7 The
representative explained that the standard policy was intended
to provide coverage for bodily injury or property damage "re-
sulting over a period of time from exposure to the insured's
waste disposal. Examples would be gradual adverse effect of
smoke, fumes, air or stream polution [sic], contamination of
water supply or vegetation."'
' 8
Today, many CGL carriers are attempting to rewrite history
and avoid the obligations which they accepted and acknowl-
when the occurrence causing the injury or damage happened. See, e.g., Appendix C-
1966 Policy. Additionally, some courts hold that the terms of the 1973 policy cover
"loss-of-use" property damage happening after the policy period, when the occur-
rence causing the damage happened during the policy period. See, e.g., Western Cas-
ualty & Sur. Co. v. Budrus, 112 Wis. 2d 348, 352, 332 N.W.2d 837, 840 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1983).
15. See Appendix D-1973 Policy.
16. Id.
17. G. Bean, Summary of Broadened Coverage Under New GL Policies with Nec-
essary Limitations to Make This Broadening Possible, (July 18, 1966) (unpublished
paper) (available in William Mitchell Law Review office). The Liberty Mutual represen-
tative also explained that the policy covers liabilities arising from gradual injury or
damage resulting over a period of time to members of the public from exposure to
poisons, or toxic or radioactive substances used by the insured in his operations. Id.
18. Id. (emphasis in original). Historical statements such as these, by knowledge-
able insurance industry representatives and organizations, demonstrate that many
CGL carriers' recent contrary interpretation of the same policy language is, at a mini-
mum, not the only interpretation. Under universal rules of insurance policy construc-
tion, terms which are reasonably subject to more than one interpretation are
ambiguous, and must be construed in favor of the policyholder. See Minnesota Min-
ing & Mfg. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 457 N.W.2d 175, 179 (Minn. 1990). Evi-
dence of the insurance industry's past interpretations of the standard CGL policy
language is therefore centrally relevant in any coverage litigation over the same lan-
guage. In many cases, the insurance industry's past interpretations should establish
coverage as a matter of law. See Bradbury, Original Intent, Revisionism, and the Meaning
of the CGL Policies, 1 ENVrL. CLAIMs J. 279, 282-83 (Spring 1989).
[Vol. 17
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edged over the past decades. As a result, the standard CGL
policy has become the focal point of a growing, nationwide dis-
pute between corporate policyholders and CGL carriers. This
article discusses the main issues underlying the dispute.
A. All Sums (Scope of Coverage)
The standard CGL insuring agreement requires the carrier
to pay all sums which the policyholder becomes legally obli-
gated to pay as damages because of bodily injury or property
damage.' 9 When continuous injury or damage occurs over the
course of numerous policy periods, an issue often arises as to
the scope of coverage afforded by each policy covering those
periods.
Most courts hold that "all sums" means any triggered policy
must cover all of the policyholder's liabilities arising from the
continuous injury or damage, regardless of whether some of
the injury or damage occurred outside of the policy period.20
The standard "all sums" insuring agreement contains no lan-
guage limiting the carrier's obligation to only a portion of
damages attributable to injury or damage occurring during the
19. See Appendices A-E.
20. See ACandS, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 764 F.2d 968, 973-74 (3d Cir.
1985) (interpreting Pennsylvania law). The court, in ACandS, Inc., stated that the
district court correctly interpreted the phrase "all sums" to provide for full coverage
once a policy was triggered. Id. at 974. See also Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N.
Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1048-49 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (Nothing in policy provides for reduc-
tion of carrier's liability when numerous policies are triggered.), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
1007 (1982); Federal Ins. Co. v. Susquehanna Broadcasting Co., 727 F. Supp. 169,
175 (M.D. Pa. 1989) (Carrier's liability is joint and several.), modified in part on other
grounds, 738 F. Supp. 896 (M.D. Pa. 1990); New Castle County v. Continental Casu-
alty Co., 725 F. Supp. 800, 817 (D. Del. 1989) (interpreting Delaware law) (Terms of
carriers' contractual liability are not affected by prior or subsequent coverage.).
One court interpreted the phrase "all sums" to mean that the insurance com-
pany must indemnify the insured for property damage taking place during prior or
subsequent periods, subject to the limits of coverage set forth in the policy. Dayton
Indep. School Dist. v. National Gypsum Co., 682 F. Supp. 1403, 1410-11 (E.D. Tex.
1988), rev'd sub nom. on other grounds, W. R. Grace & Co. v. Continental Casualty Co.,
896 F.2d 865, 872 (5th Cir. 1990). See also In re Asbestos Ins. Coverage Cases, Judi-
cial Council Coordination Proceeding No. 1072, Phase III Statement of Decision at
58 (Cal. Super. Ct., San Francisco County filedJan 24, 1990) (recognizing that carrier
assumes liabilities for damages, not the injuries that caused the damages and trig-
gered the policy); California Union Ins. Co. v. Landmark Ins. Co., 145 Cal. App. 3d
462, 193 Cal. Rptr. 461, 468 (1983) (holding that a carrier's responsibility can con-
tinue after the term of the policy expires); Gruol Constr. Co. v. Insurance Co. of N.
Am., 11 Wash. App. 632, 636, 524 P.2d 427, 430 (1974) (recognizing that coverage
was properly imposed under the language of the subject liabilities).
1991]
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policy period. 2'
Court decisions enforcing the plain meaning of the "all
sums" insuring agreement are consistent with the insurance in-
dustry's historical understanding of its standard CGL insuring
agreement. For example, in 1977 nearly thirty major carriers
attended a meeting of the American Mutual Insurance Alliance
and American Insurance Association to discuss coverage of as-
bestos-related injuries. Minutes of the meeting reported:
[T]he majority view was that coverage existed for each car-
rier throughout the period of time the asbestosis condition
developed, i.e. from the first exposure through the discov-
ery and diagnosis. The majority also contended that each
carrier on risk during any part of that period could be fully
responsible for the cost of defense and loss.
22
The effect of the "all sums" language is to hold carriers
jointly and severally liable to the policyholder for the full
amount of the policyholder's liabilities. Although a carrier
might seek contribution from other carriers, the policyholder
is under no obligation to prorate its recovery under any one
policy. The policyholder can tap the limits of and seek full in-
demnification from one or more of the triggered policies. The
"all sums" language enables the policyholder to avoid periods
of high deductibles, self-insurance or no insurance, during
which the ongoing injury or damage may have continued.
At least one court, however, has held that a policyholder
21. See Appendix E. Further, most courts hold that the standard "other insur-
ance" clause, found in the "conditions" section of the policy, may not be used to
allocate part of a loss to the policyholder. See Detrex Chem. Indus. v. Employers Ins.
of Wausau, 746 F. Supp. 1310, 1326 (N.D. Ohio 1990) (interpreting Michigan law)
("Other insurance" clauses cannot be used to impose additional liabilities on policy-
holder, by way of deductibles or otherwise.); Broderick Inv. Co. v. Hartford Accident
& Indem. Co., 742 F. Supp. 571, 573 (D. Colo. 1989) (interpreting Colorado law)
("Other insurance" clauses are only meant to prevent double recovery and may not
be used to allocate part of loss to policyholder.); Air Prod. & Chem., Inc. v. Hartford
Accident & Indem. Co., 707 F. Supp. 762, 771 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (interpreting Penn-
sylvania law) ("Other insurance" provisions apply only to apportionment of carriers'
liability and may not be used to allocate liability to policyholder through deductibles,
retrospective premiums or side indemnity agreements.); Marotta Scientific Controls,
Inc. v. RLI Ins. Co., No. 87-4438 (D.N.J. June 5, 1990) (reprinted in 4 Mealey's In-
surance Litigation Reports F-i, F-I 1 (June 26, 1990)) (interpreting New Jersey law)
(Carrier with triggered policy was liable up to policy limits, regardless of possible
injury that may have occurred prior to policy period.).
22. Memorandum of Meeting of Asbestosis Discussion Group 1 (April 21, 1977)
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who is uninsured or self-insured during part of the time in
which injury or damage occurs must bear a pro-rata share of
the total costs of defending the claims of injury or damage.
23
The court concluded that the CGL carrier "has not contracted
to pay defense costs for occurrences which took place outside
the policy period."'24 The court's reasoning is flawed, how-
ever, because the CGL carrier does contract to pay for occur-
rences happening outside the policy period, as long as the
resulting injury or damage happens during the policy period.
Further, under the plain terms of the standard CGL policy, the
carrier agrees to pay "all" of the policyholder's liabilities aris-
ing from injury or damage happening during the policy period,
not just "some" of the liabilities.
The Minnesota appellate courts have not addressed the "all
sums" issue in the context of environmental and toxic tort
claims. At least two Minnesota Supreme Court decisions, how-
ever, may influence the outcome if this issue arises.
InJostens, Inc. v. CNA Insurance/Continental Casualty Co. ,25 the
court held that a carrier has no obligation for injury occurring
outside its policy period where the period of injury can be eas-
ily identified. 26 However, theJostens court said that where dam-
ages cannot be specified to within or outside the policy period,
the carrier must pay the entire amount. 27 Environmental and
toxic tort claims typically involve continuous and repeated ex-
posures to hazardous substances, and cumulative bodily inju-
ries or property damage occurring over a number of years.
Thus, a carrier may have difficulty proving that only an identifi-
able portion of an injury or damage happened during its policy
period.
In Federated Mutual Insurance Co. v. Concrete Units, Inc. ,28 the
court held that the most sensible reading of the phrase "dam-
ages because of property damage" requires the CGL carrier to
pay "all damages which are causally related" to property dam-
23. See Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212,
1225 (6th Cir. 1980) (Where costs can be readily apportioned, it is reasonable to
have the insured pay its share of defense and indemnification costs.), reh 'g granted in
part, 657 F.2d 814 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1109 (1981).
24. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 633 F.2d at 1224-25.
25. 403 N.W.2d 625 (Minn. 1987),
26. Id. at 630.
27. Id.
28. 363 N.W.2d 751 (Minn. 1985).
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age. 29 Thus, even if a carrier were able to prove that only an
identifiable portion of injury or damage happened during its
policy period, virtually all of the claimant's expenditures in
rectifying the injury or damage can be causally related to the
injury or damage during the carrier's policy period."° Unallo-
cable consequential damages might include, for example, the
costs of pumping out contaminated groundwater or the costs
of psychiatric treatment for "cancerphobia."
B. Legally Obligated to Pay as Damages
A number of courts have held that response costs recover-
able under environmental statutes are not "damages" and
therefore are not covered under the CGL policy."' Generally,
these courts conclude that response costs are equitable in na-
ture and that the CGL policy traditionally does not cover in-
29. Id. at 757.
30. Id. See also Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 457
N.W.2d 175, 182 (Minn. 1990) (Costs associated with cleaning up contamination are
"aptly characterized as consequential damages flowing from the direct damage
caused to the environment.").
31. See Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Milliken & Co., 857 F.2d 979, 981 (4th Cir. 1988)
(interpreting South Carolina law) (Meaning of "damages" is not ambiguous, there-
fore future response costs are not covered.); Continental Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern
Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 842 F.2d 977, 985-86 (8th Cir.) (interpreting Missouri
law) (Although ordinary meaning of "damages" does not distinguish between legal
and equitable relief, the term is not ambiguous in technical "insurance context."),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 821 (1988); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d
1348, 1353 (4th Cir. 1987) (interpreting Maryland law) (Response costs, like preven-
tive measures, are not recoverable because allowing such recovery might encourage
insureds to utilize unnecessary prophylactic measures.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1008
(1988); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Morrison Grain Co., 734 F. Supp. 437,
450 (D. Kan. 1990) (interpreting Kansas law) (CERCLA response costs are for pre-
vention and mitigation, not compensation.); Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Gulf Re-
sources & Chem. Corp., 709 F. Supp. 958, 961 (D. Idaho 1989) (Response costs are
not based on property damage.); W.C. Hayes v. Maryland Casualty Co., 688 F. Supp.
1513, 1515 (N.D. Fla. 1988) (Investigation and cleanup costs not damages.); Mary-
land Cup Corp. v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 81 Md. App. 518, 527, 568 A.2d
1129, 1134 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990) (following Armco, using rationale that damages
recompense for injuries sustained); Patrons Oxford Mut. Ins. Co. v. Marois, 573
A.2d 16, 19 (Me. 1990) ("Damages" is unambiguous in meaning and response costs
are not included in definition.). Contra Jones Truck Lines v. Transport Ins. Co., No.
88-5723 (E.D. Pa. May 10, 1989) (1989 WL 71595) (interpreting Missouri law; re-
jecting Nlortheastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co.) (Missouri law does not indicate that
"damages" does not include response costs.); Chesapeake Util. Corp. v. American
Home Assurance Co., 704 F. Supp. 551, 561 (D. Del. 1989) (interpreting Maryland
law; rejecting Armco) (Contractual understanding of damages, rather than artificial
and highly technical meaning of damages ought to control.).
[Vol. 17
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junctive or equitable relief.32 According to these courts, the
CGL term "damages," although undefined in the policy, is re-
stricted to a unique, technical meaning: monetary damages
awarded pursuant to causes of action traditionally recognized
by courts of law rather than equity.33
A majority of courts, however, have ruled to the contrary,
finding that response costs are "damages" and are covered
under the CGL policy. 34 Following established rules of insur-
32. See, e.g., Milliken & Co., 857 F.2d at 981 ("We have no doubt that. . . a general
comprehensive liability policy which obligated the insurer to pay 'all sums which, the
insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages would not cover claims for
which the insured is equitably obligated to pay.' ").
33. See, e.g., Maryland Cup Corp., 81 Md. App. at 526, 568 A.2d at 1133-34 (Term
"damages" has accepted technical meaning in law.).
34. See New Castle County v. Hartford Accident & Idem. Co., Nos. 89-3814, 90-
3012, 90-3030, slip op. at 67 (3d Cir. Apr. 30, 1991) (Ordinary lay meaning of "dam-
ages" does not distinguish between legal and equitable liabilities.); Avondale Indus.,
Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 887 F.2d 1200, 1207 (2d Cir. 1989) (interpreting New
York law) ("When an insurer that drafts the instrument wants to exclude from cover-
age policy obligations it would otherwise assume, it must do so in clear and unmistak-
able language."), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2588 (1990); Federal Ins. Co. v. Susquehanna
Broadcasting Co., 727 F. Supp. 169, 174 (M.D. Pa. 1989) (interpreting Pennsylvania
law) ("Damages" includes costs of repair and costs of restoration.), aff'd in part on
other grounds, 738 F. Supp. 896 (1990); National Indem. Co. v. United States Pollution
Control, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 765, 767 (W.D. Okla. 1989) (interpreting Oklahoma law)
(The policy gave no definition for "damages" as applied to property damage, there-
fore ordinary and plain meaning applied.); Chesapeake Util. Corp. v. American
Home Assurance Co., 704 F. Supp. 551, 560 (D. Del. 1989) (interpreting Maryland
law) (Based on plain meaning, "damages" includes equitable as well as legal relief.);
Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 692 F. Supp. 1171, 1194 (N.D. Cal.
1988) (interpreting California law) (It is contrary to public interest to deny compen-
sation for early cleanup costs.); Centennial Ins. Co. v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty
Co., 677 F. Supp. 342, 350 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (interpreting Pennsylvania law) (Public
policy requires coverage for cleanup costs.); Gloucester v. Maryland Casualty Co.,
668 F. Supp. 394, 399 (D.N.J. 1987) (interpreting NewJersey law) (Clean-up requires
repairs and preventive measures, and legal causes of action exist to effectuate this.);
Independent Petrochemical Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 654 F. Supp. 1334,
1359 (D.D.C. 1986) (interpreting Missouri and New York law) ("[S]ums denominated
as 'clean-up' costs [for release of dioxins] constitute damages for purposes of liability
insurance coverage."); AIU Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 799 P.2d 1253, 1278 (Cal.
1990) ("Damages" is ambiguous in view of environmental statutory schemes elimi-
nating formal distinction between compensation and sums expended under injunc-
tion.); Hazen Paper Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 407 Mass. 689, 701,
555 N.E.2d 576, 584 (1990) (Policyholder legally liable to pay certain amount be-
cause of property damage for which the law holds it responsible.); Upjohn Co. v. New
Hampshire Ins. Co., 444 N.W.2d 813, 819 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989) (Government
cleanup order renders policyholder legally obligated to pay costs of preventing dam-
age to third parties.); United States Aviex Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 125 Mich. App.
579, 589-90, 336 N.W.2d 838, 843 (1983) ("Damages" includes response costs in-
curred by insured directly as well as payments made to third parties with valid claims
1991]
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ance contract construction, these courts recognize that the
term "damages" is undefined in the policy and therefore con-
strue the term in accordance with its plain and ordinary mean-
ing-compensation for injury sustained.35
In concluding that the plain meaning of "damages" encom-
passes response costs, courts also recognize that the remedies
available to the government under federal and state environ-
mental statutes reflect the common understanding of the term
"damages" in the context of property damage claims. Tradi-
tionally, the common law measure of damages for property
damage is the cost of restoring property to its former condi-
tion. 6 If the damaged property cannot be completely restored
to its former condition, the difference in value between the
property in its restored condition and the property in its for-
mer condition can also be recovered as damages.3 7 Conse-
for cleanup costs.); CPS Chem. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 222 N.J. Super. 175, 189-
90, 536 A.2d 311, 318 (1988) (Critical fact is that the carrier chose the language
which caused the ambiguity.); Kutsher's Country Club Corp. v. Lincoln Ins. Co., 119
Misc. 2d 889, 892, 465 N.Y.S.2d 136, 139 (Sup. Ct. 1983) (Statutory cleanup costs
reflect state's power to establish damages with respect to legislation designed to pre-
serve public resouces.); C.D. Spangler Constr. Co. v. Industrial Crankshaft & Eng'g
Co., 326 N.C. 133, 142, 388 S.E.2d 557, 563 (1990) (If a policy fails to define a term,
then it should be given meaning used in ordinary speech.); Boeing Co. v. Aetna Cas-
ualty & Sur. Co., 113 Wash. 2d 869, 887, 784 P.2d 507, 516 (1990) ("Response
costs" incurred under CERCLA are "damages" to the extent that they are incurred
from property damage.); Wagner v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 145 Wis.2d 609, 612,
427 N.W.2d 854, 855 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988) (Insured entitled to recover costs for
locating gasoline leak and venting a sewer line which became contaminated due to
such leak.), review denied, 436 N.W.2d 30 (Wis. 1990); Unigard Mut. Ins. Co. v. McCar-
thy's Inc., No. 83-1441 (D. Idaho Aug. 4, 1989) (reprinted in Mealey's Insurance
Litigation Reports D-2, D-4 (1989)) (interpreting Idaho law) (Carriers failed to de-
fine term to mean something less than ordinary definition.); Jones Truck Lines, No. 88-
5723 (E.D. Pa. May 10, 1989) (1989 WL 71595) (interpreting Missouri law) (relying
on Missouri rules of construction that terms be given their plain meaning; no basis in
Missouri law for limiting the term "damages" so as to exclude cleanup costs); GAF
Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., No. 87-3272 (E.D. La. Jan. 11, 1989) (1989 WL
1761) (interpreting Louisiana law) (Cleanup costs are part of general measure of
damages for property damage.).
35. See RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 3654 (2d ed.
1987) (Damages defined as "the estimated money equivalent for detriment or injury
sustained."); WEBsTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 571 (3d. ed. 1971)
(Damages defined as "estimated reparation in money for detriment or injury sus-
tained: compensation or satisfaction imposed by law for a wrong or injury caused by
a violation of a legal right.").
36. See Heath v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. Ry., 126 Minn. 470, 475, 148
N.W. 311, 312-13 (1914).
37. See Rinkel v. Lee's Plumbing & Heating Co., 257 Minn. 14, 20, 99 N.W.2d
[Vol. 17
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quential damages are also recoverable.38
The remedies available under federal and state environmen-
tal statutes typically reflect these basic principles of damages.
"Response costs" are the costs of restoring property to its for-
mer condition.3 9 Natural resource damages are recoverable if
the property is lost or cannot be completely restored.4 ° Con-
sequential damages also are recoverable. 4'
Courts concluding that response costs are "damages" reject
the assertion that the term implies a distinction between legal
and equitable relief. Significantly, the insurance industry's
own dictionaries define "damages" in accordance with the
term's plain and ordinary meaning-compensation for injuries
sustained-and draw no distinction between legal and equita-
ble relief.
42
Further, at least one court has reviewed evidence of the in-
surance industry's representations and practices over the past
decades, and found that the industry expressly contemplated
that the term "damages" encompassed the costs of cleaning up
779, 783 (1959). "Ordinarily the measure of damages ... is the difference in value
before and after, or the cost of restoration, whichever is the lower amount." Id.
38. See Colstrum v. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry., 33 Minn. 516, 517, 24 N.W. 255,
255 (1885) (Landowner can recover any kind of damages resulting from the property
damage, whether direct or consequential.).
39. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A) (1990) (all costs of removal or remedial action);
MINN. STAT. § 115.071, subd. 3(a) (1990) (expenses for reasonable value of cleanup);
MINN. STAT. § 115B.04, subd. 1(a),(b) (1990) (response and removal costs). See also
MINN. STAT. § 115B.02, subd. 17 (1990) ("Removal" includes cleanup, removal, dis-
posal or processing, preventative actions, and actions necessary to monitor hazard-
ous substances, including disposal.).
40. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(C) (1990) (damages for injury to, destruction of or
loss of natural resources); MINN. STAT. § 115.07 1, subd. 3(b) (1990) (just compensa-
tion for loss or destruction of wildlife); MINN. STAT. § 115B.04, subd. 1(c) (1990)
(damages for any injury to natural resources including costs of assessing damage).
41. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1990) (any other necessary costs of response
incurred); MINN. STAT. § 115.071, subd. 3(a) (1990) (compensation for reasonable
value of cleanup and other expenses directly resulting from discharge); MINN. STAT.
§ 1 15B.17, subd. 6 (1990) (reasonable and necessary expenses).
42. See W. A. JENNINGS, GLOSSARY OF INSURANCE TERMS (1969) ("Damages" de-
fined as "a sum of money claimed or awarded as compensation for loss or injury.");
H. RUBIN, BARRONS DICTIONARY OF INSURANCE TERMS 71 (1987) ("Damages" defined
as a "sum the insurance company is legally obligated to pay an insured for losses
incurred."); L. DAVIDS, DICTIONARY OF INSURANCE 62 (1983) ("estimated reparation
in money for injury sustained"); MERRITT, GLOSSARY OF INSURANCE TERMS 53 (4th ed.
1990) (the "amount required to pay for a loss"). See also Boeing Co. v. Aetna Casu-
alty & Sur. Co., 113 Wash. 2d 869, 877, 784 P.2d 507, 511 (1990) (recognizing that
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contamination of the environment.4" For example, in a 1969
document discussing coverage of liabilities for oil spills, Aetna
Casualty and Surety Company noted that "damages, including
cost to clean up, may be catastrophic .. . ."' In 1981, Aetna's
underwriting guidelines advised field offices that CERCLA
"damages" include "all costs of removal or remedial action"
and "any other necessary costs of response.
'45
Courts similarly have rejected the insurance industry's asser-
tion, often unsupported by evidence or compelling case law,
that equitable relief traditionally has not been covered by the
CGL policy.46 These courts conclude that the relevant inquiry
in determining coverage is whether the policyholder is being
asked to rectify losses to a third party on account of property
damage, not whether the action seeking that relief is legal or
equitable.47 Other courts have noted that a hypertechnical
definition of "damages" could frustrate public policy by re-
warding policyholders who delay and fail to cooperate with the
government until the government brings the precise cause of
action to which the CGL policy supposedly is limited.4 3
In Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co. v. Travelers Indemnity
Co. ,40 the Minnesota Supreme Court ruled in favor of coverage
on the "damages" issue. 50 The court concluded that the lan-
43. See Shell Oil Co. v. Accident & Casualty Ins. Co. of Winterthur, No. 278953
Civ. 65-69 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 13, 1988).
44. Letter from Edward H. Morgan, Assistant Secretary, Underwriting Depart-
ment, Commercial Casualty Division, Aetna Life & Casualty, to Norman Nachman,
Manager, Insurance Rating Board, Casualty Department (Sept. 30, 1969) (available
in William Mitchell Law Review office).
45. Interoffice Memorandum from Commercial Insurance Department to Casu-
alty field offices, Exhibit I (June 17, 1981) (available in William Mitchell Law Review
office).
46. See, e.g., United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Thomas Solvent Co., 683 F.
Supp. 1139, 1168 (W.D. Mich. 1988). "The short answer is that from the standpoint
of the insured damages are being sought for injury to property. It is that contractual
understanding rather than some artificial and highly technical meaning of damages
which ought to control." Id.
47. Id.
48. See, e.g., Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 692 F. Supp. 1171,
1193 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (Public policy favors coverage of response costs because
"there simply is not enough 'horse-power' in the EPA to clean up first and seek PRP
reimbursement later.").
49. 457 N.W.2d 175 (Minn. 1990).
50. Id. The "damages" issue was certified to the Minnesota Supreme Court by
the United States District Court in the District of Minnesota in three separate cover-
age actions. The three cases consolidated by the Minnesota Supreme Court for pur-
poses of responding to the certified question were Minnesota Mining &
[Vol. 17
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guage of the standard CGL insuring agreement "can reason-
ably be interpreted to cover any claim asserted against the
insured arising out of property damage, which requires the ex-
penditure of money, regardless of whether the claim can be
characterized as legal or equitable in nature."'5 The court
found that this interpretation is supported by the dictionary
definition of "damages" which makes no distinction between
actions seeking purely monetary relief and actions seeking
forms of equitable relief.52
The court in Minnesota Mining found that the ordinary mean-
ing of "damages," as well as the division among courts in in-
terpreting this term, demonstrates that the term is reasonably
subject to more than one interpretation. 53 Consequently, pur-
suant to established principles of insurance contract construc-
tion, the court concluded that the term "damages" is
inherently ambiguous and must be construed in favor of
coverage.54
The Minnesota Mining court also determined that coverage of
environmental clean-up costs is consistent with the reasonable
expectations of the CGL policyholder. 55 Recognizing the his-
torical risk-shifting role of CGL insurance, the court noted that
policyholders have purchased "comprehensive general liabil-
ity" policies over the past decades "expecting coverage against
most legal liabilities which could arise out of their own acts or
omissions, including liabilities which were unknown at the
time."' 56 The court explained that the utility of the broad CGL
insuring agreement "would be seriously called into question"
if coverage is permitted to hinge on the fortuity of how the
claim against the policyholder is framed. "Clearly," the
Manufacturing Co. v. Travelers Indemnity Co., C4-88-1931; Joslyn Corp. v. Liberty
Mutual Insurance Co., C9-88-2296; and Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Tonka Corp.,
C1-99-2244.
The Minnesota Supreme Court issued a 5-4 decision, with Justice Keith writing
for the majority and Justices Kelley and Coyne submitting separate dissenting
opinions.
51. Minnesota Mining &Mfg. Co., 457 N.W.2d at 179.
52. Id. at 179-80. The court also noted that "Minnesota law places little value on
antiquated distinctions between legal and equitable claims which have persisted from
the historic separation of courts of law and chancery." Id. at 179.
53. Id. at 180.
54. Id. at 180-81.
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court concluded, "the insureds under these policies contem-
plated greater certainty when they purchased the policies.
They could reasonably expect the policy to provide coverage
for any economic outlay compelled by law to rectify or mitigate
damage caused by the insured's acts or omissions."58
The Minnesota Mining court also rejected the notion that car-
riers which have sold CGL insurance over the past decades
never expected a potential obligation to indemnify policyhold-
ers for the costs of remedying contamination to the environ-
ment.5 9 The court determined that the remedies imposed by
environmental clean-up statutes were not "novel or unforesee-
able" to the policyholder or the carrier.60 Rather, the reme-
dies have existed "under prior statutes and, moreover, the
costs of restoring property to its original condition has been a
long-recognized measure of damages in common law pollution
cases." '61 Thus, the court concluded, CGL policyholders and
carriers "were aware of the potential liability for groundwater
contamination at the time they entered the insurance policies
",62
Significantly, the effect of the Minnesota Supreme Court's
analysis in Minnesota Mining reaches well beyond the "dam-
ages" issue. The court essentially determined that the broad
insuring agreement of the standard CGL policy generally cov-
ers liabilities arising from environmental contamination, and
that the CGL policyholder's expectation of coverage is quite
reasonable. The court's determination is squarely consistent
with statements made by the insurance industry over the past
decades .63
58. Id. at 181-82.
59. Id. at 183.
60. Id.
61. Id. The court cited Heath v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. Ry., 126 Minn.
470, 475, 148 N.W. 311, 312-13 (1914) which affirmed a jury verdict on damages
based on the expense of removing the defendant's sand from the plaintiff's land,
rather than the diminution in the market value of the land if the sand were allowed to
remain, because the removal expenses were less.
62. Id.
63. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
(Vol. 17
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C. Bodily Injury or Property Damage to which the
Insurance Applies I
1. Bodily Injury
The standard CGL policy defines "bodily injury" as "bodily
injury, sickness or disease sustained by a person, including
death resulting from any of these at any time."65 A number of
courts have concluded that the term "bodily injury" implies
injury of a physical nature, and that claims alleging only mental
distress are not covered.66
In the context of toxic torts, however, courts have ruled that
the CGL policy covers claims alleging "cancerphobia," in-
creased risk of disease, and other harm which is only poten-
tially physical in nature. The primary issue in many of these
cases is whether the carrier has a duty to defend the policy-
holder against a claim which arguably alleges physical injury.6 7
Courts find that the term "bodily injury" must be construed to
encompass new theories of injury arising from exposures to
64. This article focuses on coverage of losses and liabilities arising from bodily
injury or property damage. Liabilites arising from "personal injury" also may be
covered, if the policyholder's CGL insurance contract contains a standard "broad
form" endorsement. See K. Pasich, Casualty and Liability Insurance § 6.07[1][a),
Business Law Monographs 31 (MB 1990). Over the past decades, many businesses
paid extra premiums for the additional protection afforded by this endorsement.
The "personal injury" section of the standard broad form endorsement covers
liabilities arising from "wrongful entry or eviction or other invasion of the right of
private occupancy." This definition may encompass environmental and toxic tort
claims alleging trespass, interference with property rights and nuisance. See id. See
also Town of Goshen v. Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 120 N.H. 915, 918, 424 A.2d 822, 824
(1980); Fragomeno v. Insurance Co. of the West, 207 Cal. App. 3d 822, 826, 255 Cal.
Rptr. 111, 113 (1989). Further, the standard personal injury broad form coverage is
not limited by the pollution exclusion or the "expected or intended" language in the
occurrence definition. See K. Pasich, supra, at § 6.07 [l][a][iii].
65. See Appendix E-1986 Policy.
66. See Bituminous Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Izzy Rosen's, Inc., 493 F.2d 257,
260-61 (6th Cir. 1974) (interpreting Tennessee law) ("Bodily injury" does not in-
clude harm arising from false arrest, false imprisonment, or malicious prosecution.);
Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hoag, 356 N.W.2d 630, 633 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984)
("Bodily injury" does not include humiliation and mental anguish allegedly arising
from wrongful arrest and prosecution.).
67. See, e.g., United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Korman Corp., 693 F. Supp.
253, 260 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (interpreting Pennsylvania law) (Carriers had no duty to
defend insured developer against homeowner's claim that the purchased homes were
constructed near illegal landfill.); Techalloy Co. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 338 Pa. Super.
1, 8, 14-15, 487 A.2d 820, 824, 827-28 (1984) ("[I]nsurer must defend any suit in
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highly-dangerous substances "capable" of producing latent
sickness or disease.
68
In one case, for example, the court noted that the definition
of "bodily injury" is not specifically limited to an immediate
and overt manifestation of physical harm, and found the term
ambiguous with respect to "potentially progressive physical
ailments." 69 The court also noted that the issue of actual in-
jury may be relevant to the validity of the underlying tort claim
against the policyholder, but should not be relevant to cover-
age under a policy intended to protect the policyholder from
liabilities for third-party injury.70
The Minnesota appellate courts have not addressed the
meaning of the policy term "bodily injury" in the context of
toxic tort claims alleging cancerphobia or latent disease. In
Clemens v. Wilcox, 71 an assault case, the Minnesota Supreme
Court ruled that the term "bodily injury" means physical in-
jury "and does not include nonphysical harm such as mental
suffering and emotional distress."'72 The court also ruled,
however, that coverage is triggered if it is demonstrated that
the third-party claimant "sustained some bodily injury.
7"
In Clemens, there was no evidence that the claimant suffered
any physical contact.7 ' The usual toxic tort claimant, by con-
trast, alleges direct physical contact with hazardous substances
through ingestion, inhalation, or other exposure. 75 The physi-
cal nature of this contact, and its potential for producing in-
jury, may be sufficient to show "some" bodily injury, even if no
immediate injurious effects can be established.76
68. See, e.g., id. at 9, 487 A.2d at 824 ("[A]t a minimum, personal injury encom-
passes allegations of exposure to a hazardous substance, increased risk of injury, anx-
iety, various internal disorders and tissue damage .
69. Id. at 11, 487 A.2d at 826.
70. Id. at 8, 487 A.2d at 824.
71. 392 N.W.2d 863 (Minn. 1986).
72. Id. at 866 (citations omitted).
73. Id. at 867 (emphasis in original). The court further stated that "[n]o exten-
sive medical testimony is necessary to the resolution of this narrow question ..
Id.
74. Id. at 866.
75. See, e.g., Techalloy Co. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 338 Pa. Super. 1, 5,487 A.2d 820,
822 (1984).
76. Id. at 6-10, 487 A.2d at 823-25.
[Vol. 17
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Generally, the standard CGL policy defines "property dam-
age" as (1) physical injury to tangible property which occurs
during the policy period, including loss of use of the property
at any time resulting therefrom, or (2) loss of use of tangible
property which has not been physically injured, provided the
loss of use is caused by an occurrence during the policy
period. 7
Courts routinely find that contamination of soil, ground-
water, and other environmental resources constitutes physical
injury to tangible property.78 These courts, rejecting the no-
tion that environmental resources are not an identifiable prop-
erty interest, recognize that governments have a sovereign
interest in all property within their domain, on behalf of the
public and future generations. 79 Courts also note that the pol-
lution exclusion in the CGL policy expressly recognizes that
"property damage" results from environmental pollution. 0
Further, at least one court has left open the possibility of cov-
erage in situations where physical injury to or loss of use of
third-party property or environmental resources has not yet
77. For revisions to the standard definition of "property damage" since the
1940s, see Appendices A-E.
78. See Continental Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 811
F.2d 1180, 1186 (8th Cir. 1987) (Physical injury to tangible property includes dam-
age to "land, trees, air, and water."), aff'd on reh'g, 842 F.2d 977, 983-84 (1988); Port
of Portland v. Water Quality Ins. Syndicate, 796 F.2d 1188, 1194 (9th Cir. 1986)
("[Olil pollution to water is injury to tangible property."); Intel Corp. v. Hartford
Accident & Indem. Co., 692 F. Supp. 1171, 1183 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (Pollution of
groundwater is property damage.); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Thomas
Solvent Co., 683 F. Supp. 1139, 1149 (W.D. Mich. 1988) (Pollution of groundwater is
property damage.); New Castle County v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 673 F.
Supp. 1359, 1366 (D. Del. 1987) (Property damage includes harm to surface and
ground waters.); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Specialty Coatings Co., 180 Ill.
App. 3d 378, 394, 535 N.E.2d 1071, 1081 ("[R]elease of toxic wastes may cause
'property damage' . . . to the actual owner of the land, water, or air .... "), appeal
denied, 545 N.E.2d 133 (Ill. 1989); Lansco, Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Protection,
138 N.J. Super. 275, 283, 350 A.2d 520, 524 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1975) ("The
state has a right to obtain damages for an injury to public resources and the environ-
ment."), aff'd, 145 N.J. Super. 433, 368 A.2d 363 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976),
cert. denied, 73 N.J. 57, 372 A.2d 322 (1977).
79. See, e.g., United States Fidelity &Guar. Co., 180 Ill. App. 3d at 394, 535 N.E.2d at
1081 (federal interest in earth and air); Lansco, Inc., 138 NJ. Super. at 283, 350 A.2d
at 524 (state interest in public resources and environment).
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occurred, but is "imminent."'"
In Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co. v. Travelers Indemnity
Co.,82 the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA) as-
serted claims against each of the CGL policyholders for con-
taminated soil and groundwater at waste disposal sites. In
ruling on the "damages" issue, the Minnesota Supreme Court
specifically determined that "property damage has occurred in
these cases" within the meaning and scope of the CGL pol-
icy.8 3 The court explained that pollution of environmental re-
sources "is damage to public property":
The state on behalf of its citizens has a proprietary interest
in the natural resources of Minnesota. The MPCA as an
agency of the state is a named trustee of the waters of the
state. Thus, for the purposes of this analysis, the state is the
injured third party asserting claims against the insureds.
8 4
An unresolved question under Minnesota law is whether en-
vironmental contamination which is "imminent," but has not
yet happened, is sufficient to trigger coverage under the CGL
policy. In ruling that environmental clean-up costs are "dam-
ages because of property damage" under the CGL policy, the
court in Minnesota Mining limited its holding to those costs
which are necessary to effectuate the clean up of contamination
"which has already occurred" to the state's resources.85 The
court stated that "[p]urely preventative measures are not cov-
ered in the absence of property damage." '86 At least in the
context of property insurance, however, the Minnesota
Supreme Court has found coverage even though actual physi-
81. See New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection v. Signo Trading Int'l, Inc., 235 N.J.
Super. 321, 336, 562 A.2d 251, 259 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989), cert. granted, 118
N.J. 277, 570 A.2d 980 (1989).
82. 457 N.W.2d 175 (Minn. 1990).
83. Id. at 179.
84. Id. at 182 (citations omitted). See also MINN. STAT. §§ 116B.01, 116B.02, subd.
4 (1990) (Each person has interest in protection and preservation of natural re-
sources located within each state, including all air, water, land, and soil resources.);
MINN. STAT. §§ 116D.02, subd. 1, subd. 2(a) (1990) (recognizing "interrelations of all
components of the natural environment," of which state is trustee for succeeding
generations); Stillwater Water Co. v. Farmer, 89 Minn. 58, 93 N.W. 907 (1903) (Gen-
eral public has identifiable interest in environmental resources, and is harmed by
damage to this property.); Industrial Steel Container Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co.,
399 N.W.2d 156 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (implicitly recognizing that "property dam-
age" occurred in determining trigger of coverage in environmental contamination
case).
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cal damage may not have occurred. 7
3. During the Policy Period (Trigger of Coverage)
Generally, the standard CGL policy limits the definition of
covered "bodily injury" or "property damage" to injury or
damage which happens during the policy period. When con-
tinuous, repeated injury or damage occurs during the course
of numerous policy periods, an issue often arises as to which
policies are triggered.
Most courts hold that coverage is triggered under each pol-
icy in effect from the date of the initial exposure to the injury-
causing substance through the date of the discovery or
remediation of the injury. 88 In some cases, this means that in-
87. See Marshall Produce Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 256 Minn. 404,
421-22, 98 N.W.2d 280, 292-93 (1959) (Fire insurance policy covers loss of egg pow-
der deemed contaminated by government officials even though not actually physi-
cally damaged.). See also Pillsbury Co. v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 705 F.
Supp. 1396, 1399-1400 (D. Minn. 1989) (Property insurance policy covers loss of
property believed to be "susceptible" to contamination, even though no actual physi-
cal damage is shown.).
88. See Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1045-46 (D.C.
Cir. 1981) (Fact that exposure is part of "injurious process" is enough to constitute
"injury" under policy.), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007, reh'g denied, 456 U.S. 951 (1982);
Broderick Inv. Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 742 F. Supp. 571, 573 (D.
Colo. 1989) (interpreting Colorado law) (adopting "continuous trigger" method
used in Dayton Indep. School Dist. v. National Gypsum Co., 682 F. Supp. 1403, 1409
(E.D. Tex. 1988)); New Castle County v. Continental Casualty Co., 725 F. Supp. 800,
812-13 (D. Del. 1989) (interpreting Delaware law) (Each policy from the start of the
injurious process is triggered, primarily because the policy term "injury" is ambigu-
ous:); Air Prod. & Chem., Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 707 F. Supp. 762,
768 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (interpreting Pennsylvania law) ("Continuous trigger" adopted
because policyholder can be held liable for latent diseases developing long after ex-
posure.); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Thomas Solvent Co., 683 F. Supp.
1139, 1173 (W.D. Mich. 1988) (interpreting Michigan law) (Complaint which alleged
trespass by migration of toxic chemicals via underground water supply from date of
leakage to the present resulted in coverage despite leakage occurring before policy
was issued.); Dayton Indep. School Dist., 682 F. Supp. at 1409 (Triggered policies are
those in effect from time of injury to time of death or filing of claim.), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom., W. R. Grace & Co. v. Continental Casualty Co., 896 F.2d 865 (5th
Cir. 1990); Lac D'Amiante du Quebec, Ltee. v. American Home Assurance Co., 613
F. Supp. 1549, 1558-59 (D.NJ. 1985) (interpreting New Jersey law) (Exposure to
asbestos, exposure in residence, and manifestation of asbestos-related disease each
triggered coverage.), vacated on other grounds, 864 F.2d 1033 (3d Cir. 1988); Owens-
Illinois, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 597 F. Supp. 1515, 1524-26 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (interpreting Ohio law) (Policies triggered are those in effect at any point in
time between claimant's initial exposure to asbestos and manifestation of injury.);
Pacific Indem. Co. v. Bunker Hill Co., No. 79-20 10 (D. Idaho Jan. 4, 1985) (1984 WL
3256) (Coverage exists as to each of the subject insurance policies in effect at any
time during the period from the date of each claimant's initial exposure to the alleg-
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surance coverage over several decades may be triggered. For
example, suppose contamination of a municipality's ground-
water is discovered in 1983, and it is determined that one
source of the contamination is a policyholder's waste, buried in
1948. Under an exposure through discovery theory, each CGL
policy from 1948 through 1983 might be triggered.
Other courts have ruled that only the policy periods in which
injury or damage actually occurs (regardless of the dates of ex-
posure or discovery) are triggered.8 9 Courts adopting this "ac-
tual injury" approach, however, typically permit proof of injury
from the date of first exposure through the date of discovery
or remediation. For purposes of the coverage litigation, there-
fore, each policy on the risk during this period is effectively
triggered.
These "multiple trigger" decisions are consistent with the
plain terms of the standard CGL policy, which do not express
any limitation on the number of policies which may be trig-
edly injurious conditions through date of claimant's manifestation of injury or dis-
ease.); National Standard Ins. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., No. CA-3-81-1015-D (N.D.
Tex. Apr. 9, 1984) (1984 WL 23448) (Triggered policies are those in effect from date
of initial exposure to chemicals to date of manifestation of disease.); Upjohn Co. v.
New Hampshire Ins. Co., 444 N.W.2d 813, 820 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989) (Policies trig-
gered when wrongful act committed, not when insured was actually damaged.); Mar-
otta Scientific Controls, Inc. v. RLI Ins. Co., No. 87-4438 (D.NJ. June 5, 1990)
(reprinted in 4 Mealey's Insurance Litigation Reports F1, Fl 1 (June 26, 1990)) (inter-
preting New Jersey law) (Policy fails to impose temporal limitation on term "injury,"
so each policy from beginning of injurious process is triggered.).
89. See American Home Prods. Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 748 F.2d 760, 764-
65 (2d Cir. 1984) (interpreting New York law) (Exposure without "injury in fact"
does not trigger coverage.); Detrex Chem. Indus., Inc. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau,
746 F. Supp. 1310, 1324-25 (N.D. Ohio 1990) (interpreting Michigan law) ("Occur-
rence" clause unambiguously requires actual injury to trigger coverage.); Triangle
Publications v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 703 F. Supp. 367, 371 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (inter-
preting Pennsylvania law) (Insuring agreement plainly requires actual damage during
carriers' policy periods.); Independent Petrochemical Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur.
Co., 654 F. Supp. 1334, 1358 (D.D.C. 1986) (interpreting Missouri and New York
law) (Coverage is triggered at any time that the effects of exposure to dioxin actually
result in diagnosable and compensable injury to claimant.); United States v. Conser-
vation Chem. Co., 653 F. Supp. 152, 197 (W.D. Mo. 1986) (interpreting Missouri
law) (Actual injury may occur upon exposure depending on facts of each case, chemi-
cal involved, period and intensity of exposure.); In re Asbestos Ins. Coverage Cases,
Judicial Council Coordination Proceeding No. 1072, Phase V-A Statement of Deci-
sion at 16 (Cal. Super. Ct., San Francisco County filed Jan 27, 1990) (Coverage trig-
gered when allegations of complaint or other available information would permit
proof that covered property damage occurred during any portion of the period that
the policy was in effect.).
[Vol. 17
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gered in a cumulative injury situation.90 Further, the "multi-
ple trigger" rulings are consistent with the drafting history of
the standard CGL policy.9 For example, in a 1965 address to
risk managers regarding the standard CGL policy, an executive
from Insurance Company of North America explained:
In some exposure types of cases involving cumulative inju-
ries, it is possible that more than one policy will afford cov-
erage. Under these circumstances, each policy will afford
coverage to the bodily injury or property damage which oc-
curs during the policy period.92
The drafters of the CGL policy considered language that
would have restricted coverage to the limited period in which
contact with the means of injury occurred, in which both con-
tact and injury occurred, or in which injury became manifest.9 "
Instead, the drafters chose language triggering each policy in
effect during each period of continuous or repeated exposure
to conditions.9 4 The drafters' decision to reject more restric-
tive language reflects an intent not to limit coverage to one
policy in continuous injury situations.9 5
Some courts nevertheless have adopted a restrictive ap-
proach to the trigger of coverage. Several courts have ruled
that only the policies in effect during the period of exposure
are triggered. 6 These courts generally assume that the period
90. See Appendices A-E.
91. An extensive evidentiary record of the drafting history underlying the trigger
of coverage issue was developed in In re Asbestos Ins. Coverage Cases,Judicial Coun-
cil Coordination Proceeding No. 1072, Phase III (Cal. Super. Ct., San Francisco
County filed Jan. 24, 1990). See also American Home Products, 565 F. Supp. at 1500-03;
Bradbury, supra note 18, at 290-92.
92. Address by Lyman Baldwin to American Society of Insurance Management
(Oct. 20, 1965) (available in William Mitchell Law Review office).
93. See In re Asbestos Ins. Coverage Cases, Judicial Council Coordination Pro-
ceeding No. 1072, Phase III Statement of Decision at 34-38 (Cal. Super. Ct., San
Francisco County filed Jan 24. 1990).
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. See Continental Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 811
F.2d 1180, 1189 (8th Cir. 1987) (interpreting Missouri law) (Environmental damage
occurs at moment hazardous wastes are released.) aff'd on rehearing, 842 F.2d 977,
983-84 (8th Cir. 1988); Hancock Laboratories, Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 777 F.2d 520,
525 (9th Cir. 1985) (interpreting California law) ("An insurer is liable for any period
where there was an exposure to an injury causing agent."); Clemco Indus. v. Com-
mercial Union Ins. Co., 665 F. Supp. 816, 828 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (interpreting Califor-
nia law) (Coverage is triggered for any period when persons diagnosed with silicosis
were exposed to harmful silica particles.); Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos. v. Ex-Cell-O
Corp., 662 F. Supp. 71, 76 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (interpreting Michigan law) (Each time
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of exposure is the only period of injury, without addressing
when injury actually occurred. Other courts have held that the
only policy triggered is the one in effect on the date the injury
or damage becomes manifest.97 These courts fail to address
evidence that such a restriction was expressly rejected by the
drafters of the standard CGL policy.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals adopted an "actual injury,"
multiple-trigger approach in Industrial Steel Container v. Fire-
man's Fund,98 an environmental contamination case. The court
in Industrial Steel viewed the "actual injury" rule to be "suffi-
ciently broad to recognize that in cases involving long expo-
sure to a toxic substance there can be damage with more than
one manifestation and more than one insurance policy can af-
ford coverage." 99 The court rejected the argument "that there
can be only one occurrence in a case where property damage
results from continuous or repeated conditions of expo-
sure."' 00 The court also held that policies in effect even after
the date of initial manifestation were triggered because the
contamination and its manifestation was an ongoing process
occurring during the periods covered by these policies. 10 '
Policies in effect during the period of initial exposure to in-
jury-causing substances were not at issue in Industrial Steel and
were not addressed. Nevertheless, the court's emphasis on
"conditions of exposure" suggests that such policies will be
triggered absent affirmative proof by the carrier that the expo-
sure did not result in actual injury.
t0 2
environment is exposed to pollutant, coverage is triggered.); Insurance Co. of N.
Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 451 F. Supp. 1230, 1239 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (in-
terpreting Illinois and New Jersey law) (Each carrier on risk when claimant was alleg-
edly exposed to asbestos is obligated to provide defense and possible
indemnification.), aff'd, 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980), clarified on reh'g, 657 F.2d 814
(1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1109 (1981).
97. See Mraz v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1325, 1328 (4th Cir. 1986)
(interpreting Maryland law) (Coverage if injury is first discovered during policy pe-
riod.); Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 682 F.2d 12, 25 (1st Cir.
1982) (Injury "results" and triggers coverage when it becomes reasonably capable of
medical diagnosis.), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1028 (1983).
98. 399 N.W.2d 156 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
99. Id. at 159.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 159-60.
102. See also Pillsbury Co. v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 705 F. Supp. 1396,
1399 (D. Minn. 1989) (indicating that burden is on property insurer to establish ab-
sence of damage to insured property).
[Vol. 17
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4. Owned Property Exclusion
The standard CGL policy excludes property damage to
property owned, occupied, or rented by the policyholder.
Most courts hold that the exclusion does not preclude cover-
age of costs expended to clean up contaminants on the policy-
holder's own property in order to remedy damage, or prevent
further damage, to third-party property. 0 3  One court ex-
plained that "[i]t would be folly to argue, under such circum-
stances, that the insured would be required to delay taking
preventative measures, thereby permitting the accumulation of
mountainous claims at the expense of the insurance carrier.
Stated another way, the policy does not require the parties to
calmly await further catastrophe."'' 04 In subsequent decisions,
the same court left open the possibility that "imminent" dam-
age to third-party property may also be sufficient to render the
owned property exclusion inapplicable.'0 5
Minnesota law indicates that the owned property exclusion
does not preclude coverage of costs expended to remove con-
taminants from the policyholder's own property in order to
remedy or prevent damage to the environment. The law rec-
ognizes that the general public, as well as a landowner, has a
property interest in subsurface soil and groundwater, and is
harmed by contamination of these environmental resources. '0 6
103. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Quinn Constr. Co., 713 F. Supp. 35, 41 (D. Mass.
1989) (interpreting Massachusetts law) (Cleanup is done to prevent third-party prop-
erty damage, not for policyholder's own land use.); Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident
& Indem. Co., 692 F. Supp. 1171, 1185 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (Contamination of ground-
water constitutes injury to third-party property.); United States Aviex Co. v. Travel-
ers Ins. Co., 125 Mich. App. 579, 591, 336 N.W.2d 838, 843-44 (1983) (Percolating
water is not owned by owner of land under which it flows.); United States Fidelity &
Guar. Co. v.Johnson Shoes, Inc., 123 N.H. 148, 151, 461 A.2d 85, 88 (1983) (Prop-
erty damage was to property beyond leasehold of insured, and not in its "care, cus-
tody, or control."); Broadwell Realty Servs., Inc. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 218 N.J.
Super. 516, 528, 528 A.2d 76, 82 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) (Costs of preven-
tive measures to "abate the continued flow of contaminants on to adjacent lands"
were recoverable.); Marotta Scientific Controls, Inc. v. RLI Ins. Co., No. 87-4438
(D.NJ. June 5, 1990) (reprinted in 4 Mealey's Insurance Litigation Reports Fl, F15
(June 26, 1990)) (interpreting NewJersey law) (Exclusion was inapplicable to "reme-
dies designed to prevent imminent and immediate [third-party damage], even if such
measures are taken on [policyholder's] property.").
104. Broadwell Realty Servs., Inc., 218 N.J. Super. at 528, 528 A.2d at 81.
105. See, e.g., Department of Envtl. Protection v. Signo Trading Internat'l, Inc.,
235 NJ. Super. 321, 336, 562 A.2d 251, 259-60 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989).
106. See, e.g., Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Travelerz Indem. Co., 457 N.W.2d
175, 182 (Minn. 1990) ("[Piollution of the groundwater is damage to public prop-
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A claim alleging damage to the environment is therefore a
claim for third-party property damage.'1 7
Minnesota law also indicates that the costs of removing con-
taminants from owned property should be covered to the ex-
tent they are causally related to alleged third-party property
damage. According to the Minnesota Supreme Court, the
most sensible reading of the phrase "damages because of
property damage" requires the CGL carrier to pay "all dam-
ages which are causally related" to covered property dam-
age.' 08 The costs associated with cleaning up contamination
are aptly characterized as "consequential damages flowing
from the direct damage caused to the environment."' 0 9 The
carrier must pay the entire amount of damages when covered
and uncovered sums are indistinguishable. "0 Thus, the entire
cost of clean-up should be covered if the carrier fails to estab-
lish a valid basis for distinguishing those costs which it alleges
are not causally related to the alleged third-party property
damage. "'
5. Pollution Exclusion (1973)
The insurance industry developed a pollution exclusion en-
dorsement in the early 1970s and in 1973 added the exclusion
to the standard CGL policy as part of the overall revision of the
erty."). See also MINN. STAT. §§ 116B.01, 116B.02 subd. 4 (1990) (Each person is
entitled by right to protection and preservation of natural resources located within
state, including all air, water, land, and soil resources.); MINN. STAT. § 1 16D.02, subd.
2(a) (1990) (State protects environment as a trustee for future citizens.); MINN. STAT.
§ 1 16D.02, subd. 1 (1990) (recognizing "interrelations of all components of the natu-
ral environment"); Stillwater Water Co. v. Farmer, 89 Minn. 58, 93 N.W. 907 (1903)
(General public has identifiable interest in environmental resources, and is harmed
by damage to this property.).
107. See Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 457 N.W.2d at 182 ("[T]he state is the in-
jured third party asserting claims against the insureds."). Notably, two of the waste
disposal sites involved in the Minnesota Mining case were located on property owned
by the CGL policyholder. Brief for Respondent Joslyn Corporation at 2,Joslyn Corp.
v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. C9-88-2296 (Jan. 4, 1989); Brief for Respondent Tonka
Corporation at 2, Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Tonka Corp., No. C 1-88-2244 (Minn. Feb.
10, 1989).
108. Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Concrete Units, Inc., 363 N.W.2d 751, 757 (Minn.
1985).
109. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 457 N.W.2d at 182.
110. Jostens, Inc. v. CNA Insurance/Continental Casualty Co., 403 N.W.2d 625,
631 (Minn. 1987) (Entire amount of fee award to claimant covered because award not
calculated by precise formula to fall within or outside policy period.).
111. For a discussion of claims of "imminent" environmental contamination, see
supra notes 81, 85-87 and accompanying text.
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1966 form." 12 The exclusion precludes coverage of:
bodily injury or property damage arising out of the dis-
charge, dispersal, release or escape of smoke, vapors, soot,
fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals, liquids or gases, waste
materials or other irritants, contaminants or pollutants into
or upon land, the atmosphere or any water course or body
of water; but this exclusion does not apply if such discharge,
dispersal, release or escape is sudden and accidental.
The 1973 pollution exclusion plainly does not apply to pollu-
tion-related injury caused by an abrupt, unexpected event."
t3
In other pollution-related situations, however, the applicability
of the exclusion typically turns on three main issues: (1)
whether the "sudden and accidental" exception to the exclu-
sion applies; (2) whether the exclusion pertains to the policy
holder and the pollution in question; and (3) whether the in-
jury or damage "arose out of" pollution.
a. Does the "Sudden and Accidental" Exception
to the Exclusion Apply?
Courts are split on the meaning of the exception to the pol-
lution exclusion: "[T]his exclusion does not apply if such dis-
charge, dispersal, release or escape is sudden and accidental."
The disagreement arises over two questions: (1) whether the
phrase "sudden and accidental" has a temporal meaning; and
(2) whether the phrase refers to the contamination injury, the
actual discharge or release directly causing the injury, or the
act which eventually led to the injury.
A number of courts have ruled that the phrase "sudden and
112. For a discussion of the drafting history underlying the 1973 exclusion, see
Just v. Land Reclamation Ltd., 155 Wis.2d 737, 749-50, 456 N.W.2d 570, 574-75
(1990); Claussen v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 259 Ga. 333, 335-37, 380 S.E.2d 686,
688-89 (1989). See also Averback, Comparing the Old and the New Pollution Exclusion
Clauses in General Liability Insurance Policies: New Language-Same Results?, 14 B.C.
ENv'rL. AFF. L. REV. 601 (1987); Ballard & Manus, Clearing Muddy Waters: Anatomy of the
Comprehensive General Liability Pollution Exclusion, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 610 (1990); Brad-
bury, supra note 18, at 282-87.
113. See, e.g., Port of Portland v. Water Quality Ins. Syndicate, 796 F.2d 1188 (9th
Cir. 1986) (oil spill caused by sinking of ship); Bentz v. Mutual Fire, Marine & Inland
Ins. Co., 83 Md. App. 524, 540, 575 A.2d 795, 803 (1990) (Harm arose from direct,
instantaneous, unexpected, and unintended event.); Lansco, Inc. v. Department of
Envtl. Protection, 138 N.J. Super. 275, 350 A.2d 520 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1975)
(single oil spill caused by vandal), cert. denied, 73 N.J. 57, 372 A.2d 322 (1977); Evans
v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 107 Misc. 2d 710, 435 N.Y.S.2d 933 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1981) (gasoline spill caused by vandals).
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accidental" includes only those pollution events that occur
with very brief notice." 4 These decisions, however, are incon-
114. See FL Aerospace v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 897 F.2d 214, 219 (6th Cir.
1990) (interpreting Michigan law) (Plain meaning of "sudden" is "quickly", "ab-
ruptly".); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Star Fire Coals, Inc. 856 F.2d 31, 35
(6th Cir. 1988) (interpreting Kentucky law) (Ongoing discharge of coal dust over
seven years is not sudden.); Great Lakes Container Corp. v. National Union Fire Ins.
Co., 727 F.2d 30, 33-34 (1st Cir. 1984) (activity as part of regular business not sud-
den and accidental); Detrex Chem. Indus., Inc. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 746 F.
Supp. 1310, 1319 (N.D. Ohio 1990) (interpreting Michigan law) (Parol evidence rule
precludes consideration of drafting history because "sudden" is unambiguous.);
State of New York v. Amro Realty Corp., 745 F. Supp. 832, 839 (N.D.N.Y. 1990)
(interpreting New York law) (Exclusion precludes coverage of continuous and inten-
tional industrial pollution.); Northern Ins. Co. v. Aardvark Assoc., Inc., 743 F. Supp.
379, 380 (W.D. Pa. 1990) (interpreting Pennsylvania law) ("Sudden" unambiguously
means "abrupt and lasting only a short time." (quoting Lower Paxton Township v.
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 383 Pa. Super. 558, 571, 557 A.2d 393, 399
(1989)); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Morrison Grain Co., 734 F. Supp. 437,
448-49 (D. Kan. 1990) (interpreting Kansas law) (Events happening over time are
not "sudden and accidental," regardless of policyholder's subjective knowledge.); In-
dustrial Indem. Ins. Co. v. Crown Auto Dealership, Inc., 731 F. Supp. 1517, 1520
(M.D. Fla. 1990) (interpreting Florida law) ("Sudden" unambiguously means "ab-
ruptly, instantly, or within a very short period of time."); Federal Ins. Co. v. Susque-
hanna Broadcasting Co., 727 F. Supp. 169, 177 (1989) (interpreting Pennsylvania
law) (Exclusion plainly precludes coverage for gradual pollution, so there is no occa-
sion to indulge in "loose examination" of underwriting history.); C.L. Hauthaway &
Sons v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 712 F. Supp. 265, 268 (D. Mass. 1989) (inter-
preting Massachusetts law) (It "offends common sense to describe such a gradual
leak as 'sudden.' "); Borden, Inc. v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 682 F. Supp. 927, 930
(S.D. Ohio 1987) (interpreting Ohio law) (Regular deposition is not sudden.), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 68 (1989); Fischer & Porter Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 656 F.
Supp. 132, 140 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (interpreting Pennsylvania law) (Sudden means ab-
rupt.); Becker Elec. Mfg. Corp. v. Granite State Ins. Co., No. 86-CV-1294 (N.D.N.Y.
June 12, 1989) (1989 WL 63671) (interpreting New York law) (Continuous disposal
of waste solvents for twenty years is not sudden.); International Minerals & Chem.
Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 168 IIl. App. 3d 361, 378, 522 N.E.2d 758, 769 (1988)
(Sudden means abrupt.); Bentz v. Mutual Fire, Marine & Inland Ins. Co., 83 Md.
App. 524, 540, 575 A.2d 795, 803 (1990) ("Sudden" means instantaneous.); Lum-
bermens Mut. Casualty Co. v. Belleville, 407 Mass. 675, 680, 555 N.E.2d 568, 572
(1990) ("For the word 'sudden' to have any significant purpose, and not to be sur-
plusage when used generally in conjunction with the word 'accidental,' it must have a
temporal aspect."); Technicon Elec. Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co., 141
A.D.2d 124, 137, 533 N.Y.S.2d 91, 99 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (A sudden event "occurs
over a short period of time."); Waste Management of Carolinas, Inc. v. Peerless Ins.
Co., 315 N.C. 688, 700, 340 S.E.2d 374, 382-83 (1986) (Contamination over a
number of years is not sudden.); Mays v. TransAmerica Ins. Co., 799 P.2d 653, 657
(Or. App. 1990) (Exclusion upheld where pollution was "clearly intended."); Lower
Paxon Township v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 383 Pa. Super. 558, 571, 557
A.2d 393, 399 (1989) (Sudden means abrupt.); Techalloy Co. v. Reliance Ins. Co.,
338 Pa. Super. 1, 14-15, 487 A.2d 820, 827-28 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (Regular or
sporadic activity over 25 years is not sudden.); Shell Oil Co. v. Accident & Casualty
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sistent with both the drafting history and the plain meaning of
these terms.
The insurance industry used the phrase "sudden and acci-
dental" in standard boiler and machinery policies for at least
twenty years prior to incorporating the phrase into the pollu-
tion exclusion. During that time, courts and several commen-
tators interpreted the phrase as having no requirement of
immediacy or abruptness."t 5 The industry's decision to con-
tinue using the phrase "sudden and accidental" in the early
1970s demonstrates its intent that the phrase continue to be
applied in accordance with these legal precedents.
The boiler and machinery decisions are consistent with the
plain meaning of the terms "sudden" and "accidental." "Acci-
dent" (which is undefined in the standard policy) means a for-
tuitous event."t 6  In defining the term "occurrence," the
standard CGL policy associates the term "accident" with con-
tinuous or repeated exposure to conditions. Thus, "accident"
does not necessarily entail immediacy or abruptness.
The plain meaning of "sudden" (also undefined in the pol-
icy) similarly has no requirement of immediacy. The primary
dictionary definition of the term is: "[H]appening without pre-
vious notice or with very brief notice; coming or occurring un-
expectedly; not foreseen or prepared for."
'l
7
In ruling that the term "sudden" does not necessarily re-
quire an instantaneous event, one court explained:
[T]he secondary meaning [of "sudden" as "abrupt"] is so'
common in the vernacular that it is, indeed, difficult to think
of "sudden" without a temporal connotation: a sudden
Co. of Winterthur, No. 278953 Civ. 33 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. July 13, 1988)
(Sudden means unforeseen and "happening very quickly.").
115. See Anderson & Middleton Lumber Co. v. Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co.,
53 Wash. 2d 404,408-09, 333 P.2d 938, 941 (1959) (Breakage over period of one day
to three weeks was within coverage of policy because "sudden" does not mean in-
stantaneous.); New England Gas & Elec. Ass'n v. Ocean Accident & Guar. Corp., 330
Mass. 640, 654, 116 N.E.2d 671, 680-81 (1953) (Cracking of spindle of turbine was
"unexpected and unforeseen and consequently sudden."). See also 10A COUCH,
CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAw § 42:396 (2d ed. 1982) (Sudden is without previous
notice and is not synonomous with instantaneous.).
116. See, e.g., Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Bartlett, 307 Minn. 72, 77, 240 N.W.2d
310, 312-13 (1976) (Accident is an unexpected, unforeseen happening.), overruled on
other grounds, 277 N.W.2d 389 (Minn. 1979).
117. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2284 (3d ed. 1986). See
also AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1215 (2d College ed. 1982) (Primary meaning
of "sudden" is "happening without warning; unforeseen.").
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flash, a sudden burst of speed, a sudden bang. But, on re-
flection one realizes that, even in its popular usage, "sud-
den" does not usually describe the duration of an event, but
rather its unexpectedness: a sudden storm, a sudden turn
in the road, sudden death. Even when used to describe the
onset of an event, the word has an elastic temporal connota-
tion that varies with expectations: Suddenly, it's spring. See
also, Oxford English Dictionary, at 96 (1933) (giving usage
examples dating back to 1340, e.g., "She heard a sudden
step behind her"; and, "A sudden little river crossed my
path As unexpected as a serpent comes.") Thus, it appears
that "sudden" has more than one reasonable meaning.
And, under the pertinent rule of construction the meaning
favoring the insured must be applied, that is,
"unexpected." 18
Other courts similarly have ruled that the phrase "sudden
and accidental" encompasses unexpected and fortuitous
events occurring over time." 9 These courts find that the
118. Claussen v. Aetna Casuality & Sur. Co., 259 Ga. 333, 335, 380 S.E.2d 686,
688 (1989).
119. See Benedictine Sisters v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 815 F.2d 1209,
1211 (8th Cir. 1987) (interpreting South Dakota law) (Discharge of soot "clearly an
accident" regardless of long-term buildup because it was unintended and "insured
was unaware of the dangerous condition."); Time Oil Co. v. Cigna Property & Casu-
alty Ins. Co., 743 F. Supp. 1400, 1408 (W.D. Wash. 1990) (interpreting Washington
law) (Primary meaning in common usage of "sudden" is not "instantaneous" but
instead "unforeseen and unexpected."); Payne v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co.,
625 F. Supp. 1189, 1192 (S.D. Fla. 1985) (interpreting Florida law) (Policyholders
did not expect or intend gradual discharge of PCBs into environment.); Molton, Al-
len & Williams v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 347 So. 2d 95, 99 (Ala. 1977)
(Exclusion not applicable to gradual erosion of nonindustrial contaminants.); Hecla
Mining Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., No. 89SC646, slip op. at 21 (Colo. filed May
13, 1991) (Temporal connotation creates inherent contradiction because "sudden
and accidental" discharge would mean abrupt, immediate, continuous and repeated
discharge.); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Speciality Coatings Co., 180 Ill.
App. 3d 378, 386-87, 535 N.E.2d 1071, 1078 (1989) (Policy language and historical
background of exclusion negates any temporal significance to "sudden and acciden-
tal" phrase.); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Dingwell, 414 A.2d 220, 223 (Me. 1980) (Ex-
clusion "applies only to 'expected or intended' releases of pollutants."); Upjohn Co.
v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 444 N.W.2d 813, 817 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989) ("Continu-
ous discharge of chemicals may be both accidental (i.e., unintended) and sudden (i.e.,
unexpected)."); Broadwell Realty Serv., Inc. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 218 N.J.
Super. 516, 535, 528 A.2d 76, 86 (1984) (Sudden means "unexpected and unin-
tended" because such a definition meets the expectations of the insured.); Jackson
Township Mun. Util. Auth. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 186 NJ. Super. 156,
164, 451 A.2d 990, 994 (1982) ("Sudden and accidental" is simply a reaffirmation of
principle that coverage will be provided for unintended results of intentional acts.);
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Klock Oil Co., 73 A.D.2d 486, 488, 426 N.Y.S.2d 603, 605 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1980) (if unintended then within coverage since that is the "construction
[Vol. 17
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phrase is reasonably subject to this meaning,' 2 0 that the split
among courts establishes the inherent ambiguity of the
phrase,' 2' or that the drafting history of the pollution exclu-
sion compels this conclusion.
2 2
Courts also are split as to what event the phrase "sudden
and accidental" pertains. Courts have ruled that the phrase
"sudden and accidental" unambiguously refers to the "dis-
charge, dispersal, release or escape" of pollutants, not the re-
sulting injury or damage. 123 Many of these decisions, however,
do not address the distinction between the intentional disper-
most favorable to the insured"); Farm Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bagley, 64 A. D. 2d
1014, 1014, 409 N.Y.S.2d 294, 296 (1978) (Original release of contaminant may be
intentional but subsequent "dispersal" may be sudden, unexpected, unusual and un-
foreseen.); Niagara County v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 103 Misc. 2d 814, 821, 427
N.Y.S.2d 171, 176 (Sup. Ct. 1980) (Unintended dumping is within meaning of"sud-
den and accidental" because the court "must accept the interpretation most
favorable to the insured."), aff'd, 80 A.D.2d 415, 439 N.Y.S.2d 538 (N.Y. App. Div.
1981); Buckeye Union Ins. Co. v. Liberty Solvents & Chem. Co., 17 Ohio App. 3d
127, 134, 477 N.E.2d 1227, 1235 (1984) ("Sudden" is not limited to an "instantane-
ous happening"; term should be given interpretation "most favorable to the in-
sured."). Just v. Land Reclamation, Ltd., 456 N.W.2d 570, 573-78 (Wis. 1990)
(Dictionaries, drafting history, and split among courts demonstrate "sudden and ac-
cidental" is susceptible to more than one reasonable meaning.). See also Colonie Mo-
tors Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 538 N.Y.S.2d 630, 632 (N.Y. App. Div.
1989) (Exclusion is inapplicable where discharge is not readily discoverable and has
continued for period of time through no fault of policyholder.).
120. See, e.g., Time Oil Co., 743 F. Supp. at 1408 (Primary meaning of "sudden" in
common usage does not connote a temporal restriction.); Claussen, 259 Ga. at 335,
380 S.E.2d at 688 (Because" '[s]udden' has more than one reasonable meaning[, ...
the meaning favoring the insured must be applied, that is, 'unexpected.' ");Just, 456
N.W.2d at 573 (noting that "recognized dictionaries differ on the primary definition
of 'sudden,' " giving evidence to the ambiguity).
121. See, e.g., New Castle County, slip op. at 86 ("That so many learned jurists
throughout the nation differ [is] additional proof that the phrase admits of two rea-
sonable constructions.");Just, 456 N.W.2d at 578 ("Substantial conflicting authority
exists with respect to the 'correct' interpretation of the exclusionary terms.").
122. See, e.g., Just, 456 N.W.2d at 573 (noting that the "insurance industry itself
originally intended the phrase to be construed as 'unexpected and unintended' ");
Speciality Coatings Co., 180 Ill. App. 3d at 387, 535 N.E.2d at 1077 (Interpreting "sud-
den" to mean "abrupt" and "instantaneous" contravenes insurance industry's an-
nounced intent when it added exclusion to policy.).
123. See, e.g., Technicon Elec. Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co., 141
A.D.2d 124, 139, 533 N.Y.S.2d 91, 100 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) ("The pollution exclu-
sion clause in the policies now under review unambiguously provides coverage only
where damage results from discharges which are sudden and accidental." (emphasis in
original)), aft'd, 74 N.Y.2d 66, 542 N.E.2d 1048, 544 N.Y.S.2d 531 (N.Y. Ct. App.
1989); Mays v. TransAmerica Ins. Co., 103 Or. App. 578, 585, 799 P.2d 653, 657
(1990) ("Sudden and accidental" exception plainly applies to discharge of pollutants,
not resulting damage.); Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Sunnes, 77 Or. App. 136, 141, 711
P.2d 212, 214 (1985) ("[T]he pollution exclusion clause is designed to exclude cov-
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sal of contaminants within an area of containment and the un-
expected dispersal of the contaminants from the intended
containment into third-party property.
Suppose, for example, in 1961 a sealed, steel drum of waste
material is buried in an approved landfill with a clay lining.
Sometime thereafter, unbeknownst to anyone, the drum cracks
and releases contaminants which eventually burst through the
lining of the landfill and contaminate third-party soil and
groundwater. Does the phrase "sudden and accidental" per-
tain to the initial dispersal of contaminants into the drum, to
the dispersal of the drum into the landfill, to the escape of con-
taminants from the drum, or to the escape of contaminants
from the clay lining of the landfill?
Because the subject of the CGL policy is third-party property
damage, one might reasonably assume that the dispersal of
contaminants into third-party property is the event to which
"sudden and accidental" pertains. This view of the "sudden
and accidental" exception to the pollution exclusion would be
consistent with the definition of occurrence-a fortuitous
event resulting in third-party property damage neither ex-
pected nor intended from the standpoint of the policyholder.
In fact, this view of the "sudden and accidental" exception is
supported by the drafting history of the 1973 pollution exclu-
sion. The insurance industry's statements and practices in the
early 1970s demonstrate that it did not intend the pollution
exclusion to add new restrictions to the standard CGL cover-
age for liabilities arising from third-party injury or damage.
Rather, the purpose of the pollution exclusion was merely to
restate the "occurrence" definition and reaffirm that expected
or intended injury or damage arising from pollution was not
covered. 
124
In the early 1970s the insurance industry gained approval of
the new exclusion from state insurance departments and com-
missioners based on its representations that the exclusion did
not change existing coverage. 125 Insurance industry publica-
erage for occurrences in which pollutants are intentionally discharged, whether or
not they are believed to be deleterious.").
124. See 3 R. LONG, LAW OF LIABILrrY INS. app. at 58 (1974) (The exclusion "elimi-
nates coverage for damages arising out of pollution or contamination, where such
damages appear to be expected or intended on the part of the insured and hence are
excluded by the definition of 'occurrence.' ").
125. See Just, 456 N.W.2d at 575 (Exclusion approved by state insurance commis-
[Vol. 17
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tions also emphasized that the pollution exclusion was no
more than a restatement of the "occurrence" definition:
In one important respect, the exclusion simply reinforces
the definition of occurrence. That is, the policy states that it
will not cover claims where the "damage was expected or
intended" by the insured and the exclusion states, in effect,
that the policy will cover incidents which are sudden and
accidental-unexpected and not intended.'
26
Similarly, the American Insurance Association reassured poli-
cyholders that they "would generally be considered covered
[for damage arising from pollution] if they could show contin-
uing efforts to maintain compliance with local, state and fed-
eral pollution codes and standards."'
' 27
A number of court decisions, consistent with the drafting
history of the pollution exclusion and the definition of "occur-
rence," indicate that "sudden and accidental" pertains to the
injury or damage resulting from pollution, not the act which
eventually gives rise to the pollution. 121 Thus, coverage may
sioners based on insurance industry's representations that exclusion restated "occur-
rence" definition and did not reduce scope of coverage.); Claussen, 259 Ga. at 337,
380 S.E.2d at 689 (Insurance industry represented that purpose of new clause was to
exclude coverage only for intentional damage, and that "'the impact of the [pollu-
tion exclusion clause] on the vast majority of risks would be no change.' "); United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Specialty Coatings Co., 180 Ill. App. 3d 378, 387, 535
N.E.2d 1071, 1077 (1989) (Insurance industry represented to West Virginia Insur-
ance Commissioner that intent of pollution exclusion "was to 'clarify that the defini-
tion of occurrence excludes damages that can be said to be expected or intended.'"
(emphasis in original)). See also Bradbury, supra note 18, at 282-87.
126. [Property & Casualty] Fire Casualty & Surety Bulls., (Nat'l Underwriter Co.)
Pub. Liab., at 126 (May 1971).
127. Earth Day, 1970, J. INS. 14, 17 (July-Aug. 1970) (available in William Mitchell
Law Review office).
128. See Pepper's Steel & Alloys, Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 668 F.
Supp. 1541, 1549 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (interpreting Florida law) ("[W]here a spill or
release of chemical substances ... is neither expected nor intended ... it follows that
it was 'sudden and accidental.' "); Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 662
F. Supp. 71, 75-76 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (interpreting Michigan law) (Decisive inquiry is
"whether the pollutants entered the environment unexpectedly and unintention-
ally."); C.K. Smith & Co. v. American Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co., No. 85-32950
(Mass. Super. Sept. 27, 1989), (reprinted in Mealey's Insurance Litigation Reports F3
(Oct. 10, 1989)) (Contamination was "sudden and accidental," therefore it fell within
definition of "occurrence."); Jonesville Prods., Inc. v. Transamerica Ins. Group, 156
Mich. App. 508, 512, 402 N.W.2d 46, 48 (1986) ("[T]he pollution exception focuses
on the release of pollutants." (emphasis in original)); Broadwell Realty Servs., Inc. v.
Fidelity & Casualty Co., 218 N.J. Super. 516, 534, 528 A.2d 76, 85-86 (1987) ("[T]he
'sudden and accidental' exception .. .will cover claims where the injury was 'neither
expected nor intended'; [iut is a reaffirmation that coverage will not be provided for
expected and hence avoidable results." (quotingJackson Township Mun. Utils. Auth.
1991]
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be provided for damage to third-party property from inten-
tional waste disposal, where the damage was neither expected
nor intended from the policyholder's standpoint. 2
9
The Minnesota Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the policy-
holder on these issues in Grinnell Mutual Reinsurance Co. v. Was-
muth.' 30 In that case, third-party injury and damage arose from
continuous and repeated exposure to formaldehyde fumes em-
anating from deteriorating insulation. 3 ' The appellate court
ruled that the pollution exclusion was inapplicable, in part be-
cause the release of pollutants was "sudden and accidental."
32
The Grinnell court first determined that the contamination
injury was caused by an "accident."' 133 The court then de-
clined to accept the carrier's argument that the term "sudden"
necessarily means "abrupt" or "quickly."' 134 The court found
the term "sudden" to be reasonably subject to more than one
meaning and thus ambiguous.
35
Further, the court in Grinnell indicated that, even under the
carrier's restrictive definition of "sudden," the pollution exclu-
sion often might be inapplicable. 136 The court explained how
each actual escape of the contaminant (formaldehyde fumes)
from its intended means of containment (the insulation), and
the initial contact with the person or property of third parties,
might be an abrupt event.
37
The Minnesota Supreme Court adopted the same analysis of
the word "sudden" as early as 1937. In City of Detroit Lakes v.
Travelers Indemnity Co. ,13s the court found that a boiler and ma-
v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 186 N.J. Super. 156, 164, 451 A.2d 990, 994
(1982)));Just v. Land Reclamation, Ltd., 456 N.W.2d 570, 578 (Wis. 1990) ("Sudden
and accidental" means unexpected and unintended damages.).
129. See, e.g., Niagara County v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 103 Misc. 2d 814, 427
N.Y.S.2d 171 (N.Y. Super. 1980), aff'd, 80 A.D.2d 415, 439 N.Y.S.2d 538 (1981).
130. 432 N.W.2d 495 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
131. Id. at 497.
132. Id. at 499-500.
133. "It is undisputed that damages alleged here were caused by an accident-an
event, including continuous exposure, where [the policyholder] neither intended nor
expected to cause harm." Id. at 499.
134. Id. at 499-500.
135. "Especially when used in conjunction with 'accidental,' suddenness may be
interpreted reasonably to include the unexpected release of formaldehyde into [the
third-party claimant's] home, causing unanticipated damage." Id. at 499.
136. Id. at 500.
137. Id.
138. 201 Minn. 26, 275 N.W. 371 (1937).
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chinery insurance policy covered an engine breakdown even
though "the factors of causation may have been gradual and
even slow in operation .... ,,'39 The court distinguished this
gradual process from the moment when the engine casting
ruptured, which "doubtless was sudden."'' 40 A similar distinc-
tion, between the factors of causation and the moment of
injury or damage, could be applied in many cases of contami-
nation injury.
In Grinnell, the court of appeals also indicated that the
phrase "sudden and accidental" applies to the contamination
injury, rather than the act eventually giving rise to that in-
jury.' 4 ' The court focused on whether the policyholder ex-
pected or intended the harm, or the release directly causing
the harm, rather than on the intentional act (installation of in-
sulation) which led to the harm.
42
b. Does the Exclusion Pertain to the Policyholder and the Pollution?
A number of courts have held that the 1973 pollution exclu-
sion is inapplicable to injury or damage arising from non-envi-
ronmental pollution.1 43  These courts conclude that the
phrase, "into or upon land, the atmosphere or any water
course or body of water" demonstrates an intent to limit the
exclusion to releases into the general environment at large.
Thus, for example, the exclusion would not apply to injury or
damage arising from toxic fumes which do not escape the
workplace or other confined area.'44
139. Id. at 28, 275 N.W. at 372.
140, Id.
141. Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance Co. v. Wasmuth, 432 N.W.2d 495, 499 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1988) ("Sudden" may apply to "unexpected release of formaldehyde.").
142. Id. at 499-500.
143. See C.H. Heist Caribe Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co., 640 F.2d 479,
483 (3d Cir. 1981) (interpreting Virgin Islands law) (contamination occurring at
workplace); National Standard Ins. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., No. CA-3-81-1015-D
(N.D. Tex. Apr. 9, 1984) (interpreting Texas law) (injury due to prolonged exposure
to chemicals); Pepper Indus., Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 67 Cal. App. 3d 1012, 1017, 134
Cal. Rptr. 904, 908 (1977) (explosion and fire from discharge of gasoline into city
sewer system); Connor v. Farmer, 382 So. 2d 1069, 1070 (La. Ct. App. 1980) (work-
place environment known to be polluted), cert. denied, 385 So. 2d 267 (La. 1980),
overruled in part on other grounds, Picou v. Ferrera, 412 So. 2d 1297, 1300 (La. 1982);
Clement v. Taylor, 382 So. 2d 231, 234 (La. Ct. App. 1980) ("[M]aintenance of gas
lines does not appear as one of the listed operations to which the exclusionary clause
applies.").
144. See also New York v. Travelers Indem. Co., 120 A.D.2d 251, 254, 508
1991]
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Other courts have held that the pollution exclusion is inap-
plicable to injury or damage arising from non-industrial pollu-
tants.14 5 These courts conclude that the terms "soot, fumes,
acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals, liquids or gases" demonstrate an
intent to limit the exclusion to industrial-type emissions, irri-
tants, contaminants and pollutants. 46
Similarly, courts have held that the pollution exclusion is in-
applicable to policyholders which are not industrial 147 or "ac-
tive" polluters. 148  These decisions often are based on the
reasonable expectations of the policyholder, given the nature
and size of its business activities and the type of contamination
injury alleged. Other courts have concluded that the pollution
exclusion is inapplicable when the alleged polluter is a third
party, rather than the policyholder.
49
N.Y.S.2d 698, 701 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (Groundwater is not watercourse or body of
water.).
145. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Armstrong, 479 So. 2d 1164, 1168 (Ala.
1985) (damage caused by overflow of raw sewage); Molton, Allen & Williams, Inc. v.
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 347 So. 2d 95, 96-97 (Ala. 1977) (damage caused by
erosion of sandstone materials); A-I Sandblasting & Steamcleaning Co. v. Baiden, 53
Or. App. 890, 896, 632 P.2d 1377, 1380 (1981) (damage caused by overspray of paint
on passing vehicles). See also Hicks v. American Resources Ins. Co., 544 So. 2d 952,
954 (Ala. 1989) (distinguishing between natural material and pollutants).
146. Armstrong, 479 So. 2d at 1168 (Phrase demonstrates intent "to protect the
environment by eliminating coverage for industry-related pollution damages.");
Molton, Allen & Williams, Inc., 347 So. 2d at 99 (Intent of clause "was to eliminate
coverage for damages arising out of pollution or contamination by industry-related
activities.").
147. Molton, Allen & Williams, Inc., 347 So. 2d at 99 (Real estate developer would
not reasonably expect its construction activities to be included within scope of pollu-
tion exclusion.).
148. Jackson Township Mun. Utils. Auth. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 186
N.J. Super. 156, 163, 451 A.2d 990, 993-94 (1982) (Municipality which intentionally
deposited waste did not expect or intend that waste would seep into aquifer.); Auto-
tronic Sys., Inc. v. Aetna Life & Casualty, 89 A.D.2d 401,403,456 N.Y.S.2d 504, 505-
06 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (The purpose of the exclusion would not be served by
applying it to policyholders not engaged in actual polluting activity.); Niagara County
v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 103 Misc. 2d 814, 818, 427 N.Y.S.2d 171, 174 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1980) ("[T]he pollution exclusion was solely meant to deprive active polluters of
coverage."); A-I Sandblasting &Steamcleaning Co., 53 Or. App. at 896, 632 P.2d at 1380
(The carrier had knowledge of the nature of policyholder's business and also knew
previous similar claims had been made against policyholder.); United Pac. Ins. Co. v.
Van's Westlake Union, Inc., 34 Wash. App. 708, 710, 664 P.2d 1262, 1264 (1983)
(The pollution exclusion clause "was intended to deprive active polluters from
coverage. ").
149. Covington Township v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., 639 F. Supp. 793, 799
(M.D. Pa. 1986) (interpreting Pennsylvania law) (Exclusion applies only when
"named insured" discharges waste material.); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v.
Specialty Coatings Co., 180 Ill. App. 3d 378, 388, 535 N.E.2d 1071, 1078 (1989)
[Vol. 17
36
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 4 [1991], Art. 1
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol17/iss4/1
INSURANCE COVERAGE
In Grinnell Mutual Reinsurance Co. v. Wasmuth,150 the Minne-
sota Court of Appeals held that the pollution exclusion did not
apply to the non-industrial polluter and the type of pollution
involved in the case. 15 1 Grinnell involved the release of formal-
dehyde fumes within a single-family dwelling due to the deteri-
oration of insulation installed by the policyholder, a small
business. 152
The court in Grinnell considered "the nature and purpose of
the [1973] pollution exclusion,"'' 5 3 and found that "[flew ele-
ments of the typical pollution claim are present in this case."1
5 4
The court concluded that, under "the broad coverage af-
forded," the policyholder would reasonably expect coverage
from the insurance he purchased "to protect himself from
damage resulting from the installation of insulation."' t5 5 The
court noted that the policyholder "did not generate or pro-
duce a known hazardous substance, nor did he dispose of toxic
waste as part of his business."'' 56 The Grinnell court declined to
decide if the phrase "upon land, the atmosphere or any water
course or body of water" limited the pollution exclusion to
contamination of the environment at large, 157 although the
court did note that the damage was confined to the interior of
a home.
158
c. Did the Injury or Damage "Arise Out Of" Pollution?
The pollution exclusion provides that the injury or damage
at issue must arise out of the discharge of pollutants. Courts
have ruled that the exclusion does not preclude coverage of
injury or damage which was solely or concurrently caused by
an event other than the discharge of pollutants.
159
(Exclusion historically read not to include unintentional acts involving third parties.).
See Niagara County, 103 Misc. 2d at 817, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 174 (Exclusion inapplicable
to policyholder which did not dump any contaminants.); Van's Westlake Union, 34
Wash. App. at 710, 664 P.2d at 1264 (Exclusion only intended to deprive actual pol-
luter of coverage.).
150. 432 N.W.2d 495 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
151. Id. at 501.
152. Id. at 497.
153. Id. at 499.
154. Id. at 498.
155. Id. at 499.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 500.
158. Id.
159. See Clement v. Taylor, 382 So. 2d 231, 234 (La. Ct. App. 1980) (Release of
1991]
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The Minnesota Court of Appeals declined to adopt this posi-
tion, at least in the context of the revised 1986 pollution exclu-
sion. In League of Minnesota Cities Insurance Trust v. City of Coon
Rapids, '160 the policyholder argued that the release of toxic pol-
lutants was only one of many proximate causes of the alleged
contamination injuries. 6 The court ruled that the expanded
1986 pollution exclusion clause precluded a duty to defend or
indemnify, reasoning that a policyholder could always contend
that some intervening factor caused the harm, "which would
be 'tantamount to reading the [pollution exclusion clause] out
of the policy altogether.' "162 The court concluded that the
policyholder's claim was properly denied "once the pollutant
was introduced into the occurrence."'
163
The court of appeals' holding in Coon Rapids may be incon-
sistent with several established principles of insurance law. A
CGL insurer is obligated to defend its policyholder if the claim
brought against the policyholder arises from facts suggesting
that coverage potentially or arguably exists.' 64 Thus, allega-
tions that injury or damage arose from causes other than the
release of pollutants should trigger at least a duty to defend.
The Coon Rapids decision also is inconsistent with the insur-
ing intent of the CGL policy. Traditionally, the purpose of
CGL coverage has been to afford comprehensive, blanket pro-
tection from all risks and causes of loss not specifically ex-
cluded in the policy. 165 Injury and damage arising from causes
independent of the release of pollutants should be covered.
contaminants from exploding pipeline due to negligent maintenance); Pepper In-
dus., Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 67 Cal. App. 3d 1012, 1017, 134 Cal. Rptr. 904,908 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1977) (fire and explosion resulting from discharge of gasoline into sewer
system).
160. 446 N.W.2d 419 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
161. Id. at 421. In Coon Rapids, claimants allegedly sustained lung injuries from
the fumes of a mechanized ice cleaning machine while inside an ice arena owned by
the policyholder. Id. at 420.
162. Id. at 421 (quoting Healy v. Tibbits Constr. Co. v. Foremost Ins. Co., 482 F.
Supp. 830, 837 (N.D. Cal. 1979)).
163. Id. at 421-22.
164. See Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. v. Judd Co., 380 N.W.2d 122, 126 (Minn. 1986)
(holding that if any part of claim against insured arguably falls within coverage, in-
surer must defend); Prahm v. Rupp Constr. Co., 277 N.W.2d 389, 390 (Minn. 1979)
(Ambiguity is resolved in favor of insured and, unless claim is clearly outside the
coverage, insurer has a duty to defend.).
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In a similar vein, the Coon Rapids decision is contrary to the
"contributing cause" rule adopted in cases involving the com-
prehensive "all risks" property insurance policy. The Minne-
sota Supreme Court has ruled that the "all risks" policy covers
a loss when any one of the contributing causes of the loss is not
specifically excluded under the policy, even though an ex-
cluded cause may have contributed to the loss.
16 6
The court of appeals' contrary reasoning in Coon Rapids may
have been influenced by two factors. First, the facts of the case
indicate that the discharge of pollutants was not merely a con-
tributing cause of the injuries.' 67 Rather, the discharge ap-
peared to be the primary and immediate cause of the
contamination injuries, superseding all other causes.' 6 Sec-
ond, the court may have been swayed by the seeming breadth
of the new, expanded pollution exclusion which, unlike the
1973 exclusion, appears to exclude any injury or damage re-
motely associated with pollution. 69 As discussed below, how-
ever, this was not the intent of the insurance industry, and
policyholders can and should reasonably expect coverage of
contamination injury or damage not specifically excluded by
the new provision.
6. Revised Pollution Exclusion (1986)
In the mid-1980s the insurance industry expanded the pollu-
tion exclusion as part of the overall revisions to the standard
CGL policy. The 1986 standard policy excludes from
coverage:
2. f. (1) "Bodily injury" or "property damage" arising out
of the actual, alleged or threatened discharge, dis-
persal, release or escape of pollutants:
166. See Henning Nelson Constr. Co. v. Fireman's Fund Am. Life Ins. Co., 383
N.W.2d 645, 653 (Minn. 1986) ("This court has held that an insured is entitled to
recover from an insurer where a cause of the loss is not excluded under the policy.");
Campbell v. Insurance Serv. Agency, 424 N.W.2d 785, 789 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988)
("[Elvidence indicated that there were eight possible causes of the damage to the
Campbell home, any of which could have contributed to the damage.").
167. Coon Rapids, 446 N.W.2d at 421.
168. Id. The policyholder argued that injuries resulted not only from the
Zamboni machine emission, but also from the build-up of pollutants due to the fail-
ure of the defendant to adequately ventilate the ice arena. The court rejected this
argument stating: "Under appellant's reasoning the pollution exclusion could never
apply in a closed space because the build-up, rather than the emission, causes harm
in a closed space." Id.
169. Id. at 422.
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(a) At or from premises you own, rent or occupy;
(b) At or from any site or location used by or for
you or others for the handling, storage, dispo-
sal, processing or treatment of waste;
(c) Which are at any time transported, handled,
stored, treated, disposed of, or processed as
waste by or for you or any person or organiza-
tion for whom you may be legally responsible;
or
(d) At or from any site or location on which you or
any contractors or subcontractors working di-
rectly or indirectly on your behalf are perform-
ing operations:
(i) if the pollutants are brought on or to the
site or location in connection with such op-
erations; or
(ii) if the operations are to test for, monitor,
clean up, remove, contain, treat, detoxify or
neutralize the pollutants.
(2) Any loss, cost, or expense arising out of any govern-
mental direction or request that you test for, moni-
tor, clean up, remove, contain, treat, detoxify, or
neutralize pollutants.
Pollutants means any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irri-
tant or contaminant, including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes,
acids, alkalis, chemicals and waste. Waste includes materi-
als to be recycled, reconditioned or reclaimed.
In sum, the revised provision excludes coverage of injury or
damage arising from an actual or threatened release of "pollu-
tants" (a) at or from the policyholder's owned premises or site
of ongoing operations using the pollutants, or (b) from the
policyholder's "waste" (wherever it is located). The exclusion
also precludes coverage of any expenses arising out of govern-
mental requests to monitor or clean-up "pollutants."
Although the 1986 standard pollution exclusion appears
"absolute" in scope, this was not the insurance industry's in-
tent. 170 Many instances of contamination-related injury or
damage remain covered by the standard CGL policy, regard-
less of whether the pollution at issue was gradual or abrupt.
170. See Hendrick & Wiezel, The New Commercial General Liability Forms-An Introduc-
tion and Critique, 37 FED'N INS. & CORP. COUNS. Q. 318, 347-48 (1986).
(Vol. 17
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The standard 1986 policy should cover contamination injury
or damage arising from:
1. the policyholder's products when off-premises;
2. the policyholder's off-premises completed operations;
3. the policyholder's off-premises ongoing operations, if
the pollutants at issue were not introduced or used as part
of the operations;
4. causes other than the actual or threatened release of
pollutants;
5. non-environmental pollution;
6. non-industrial pollutants or wastes, or pollutants or
wastes from a non-industrial polluter.
The Insurance Services Office, which drafted the revised
pollution, has indicated that the exclusion does not preclude
coverage of the first three situations listed above.' 7' Coverage
of the situations remaining, however, awaits judicial
refinement.
In particular, the phrase "arising out of" was carried over to
the 1986 exclusion without clarification, suggesting that the
new exclusion (like the 1973 exclusion) may not apply when
the injury or damage at issue was solely or concurrently caused
by an event other than the release of pollutants. 172 So far,
however, courts interpreting the 1986 exclusion have con-
cluded that it bars coverage if pollution is a cause of the injury
or damage, regardless of other causes.
173
At least one commentator suggests that the 1986 pollution
exclusion may not apply to non-environmental pollution.'
74
The phrase "into or upon land, the atmosphere or any water
course or body of water" in the 1973 pollution exclusion was
not used in the revised exclusion. Nevertheless, the phrase
"discharge, dispersal, release or escape of pollutants" in the
171. See id. (citing the Insurance Services Office Workbook on the 1986 policy
forms, endorsements and rules).
172. See Averback, supra, note 112, at 639-42.
173. See, e.g., Guilford Indus. Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 688 F. Supp. 792, 795-
96 (D. Me. 1988) (rejecting policyholder's argument that proximate cause of damage
was flooding and not oil leak resulting from flood). Decisions such as this one may
be inconsistent with case law defining the CGL carrier's broad duty to defend, the
comprehensive insuring intent underlying CGL coverage, and the "contributing
cause" rule governing comprehensive "all risks" policies. See supra notes 164-66 and
accompanying text.
174. See Averback, supra, note 112, at 643-44.
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1986 exclusion suggests that only contamination of the envi-
ronment-at-large is excluded.
Another open question is whether the definition of pollu-
tants 75 demonstrates an intent (as in the 1973 exclusion) to
limit the exclusion to industrial contaminants and industrial
polluters. One court found the term "waste" to be ambiguous,
and declined to rule as a matter of law that recycled waste ma-
terial (including construction debris, rock, brick, wood, glass,
and aluminum) is an "irritant or contaminant."'' 76 Another
court has indicated that virtually any substance might fall
within the exclusion once it becomes an irritant or contami-
nant, and that environmental statutes are "an excellent source
of information concerning what constitutes a pollutant." 177
The Minnesota Court of Appeals analyzed the 1986 revised
pollution exclusion in League of Minnesota Cities Insurance Trust v.
City of Coon Rapids.' 78 The case involved a claim against the city
of Coon Rapids for injuries arising out of the release of nitro-
gen dioxide gases, within an enclosed ice arena, from a
Zamboni ice cleaning machine.' 79 The environment outside of
the ice arena was not contaminated; the city was not an indus-
trial (or actual) polluter; and the nitrogen dioxide was not nec-
essarily an industrial pollutant. 80 The court of appeals
concluded that the 1986 pollution exclusion barred coverage,
without specifically addressing whether the exclusion applies
to non-environmental contamination within a confined space,
or to non-industrial polluters and pollutants.18' In view of the
seeming breadth of the 1986 pollution exclusion, the court in
Coon Rapids may have been reluctant to conclude that the city
reasonably expected coverage.
175. Pollutants are defined as any "solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or
contaminant, including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals and
waste." Appendix E-1986 Policy.
176. In re Hub Recycling, 106 B.R. 372, 376 (D.NJ. 1989).
177. Guilford Indus. Inc., 688 F. Supp. at 793-94.
178. 446 N.W.2d 419 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
179. Id. at 420.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 422. Cf Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance Co. v. Wasmuth, 432 N.W.2d 495,
499 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (1973 pollution exclusion inapplicable to policyholder
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D. Caused by an Occurrence
The standard CGL policy provides that the bodily injury or
property damage at issue must have been caused by an occur-
rence.' "Occurrence" is defined as "an accident, including
continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, which results
in bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor in-
tended from the standpoint of the insured."'' 8 3 The term "ac-
cident," undefined in the policy, typically is construed by
courts to mean an unexpected happening.
84
Insurance carriers frequently allege that liabilities arising
from contamination injury are not covered because the injury,
or the event causing the injury, was expected or intended by
the policyholder. This ground for denying coverage often is
extensively fact-oriented, and substantially increases the scope
and expense of coverage litigation. The carriers' allegations
may implicate scores of witnesses and countless documents
pertaining to the policyholder's operations and knowledge
over several decades.
Courts are split over the extent to which the carriers can use
this exclusionary phrase to deny coverage. The debate focuses
primarily on two issues: (1) the degree of knowledge or pur-
pose the carrier must establish to exclude coverage; and (2)
whether an objective standard can be used to exclude
coverage.
In determining whether a contamination injury was "ex-
pected or intended," a number of courts have adopted a
threshold only slightly higher than a "foreseeability" or negli-
gence standard, and have evaluated expectations from the ob-
jective standpoint of a reasonably prudent person, rather than
the policyholder.8 5 Typically, these courts rule that coverage
182. See Appendix C-1966 Policy. Prior to 1966, the standard policy used the
phrase "caused by accident." See Appendices A and B.
183. Id.
184. See, e.g., Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Bartlett, 307 Minn. 72, 77, 240 N.W.2d
310, 312-13 (1976) (citing Hauenstein v. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 242 Minn.
354, 358, 65 N.W.2d 122, 126 (1954)).
185. See City of Carter Lake v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 604 F.2d 1052, 1059 n.4
(8th Cir. 1979) (interpreting Iowa law) ("[Ilndications must be strong enough to
alert a reasonably prudent man not only to the possibility of the results occurring but
the indications also must be sufficient to forewarn him that the results are highly
likely to occur."); Township of Gloucester v. Maryland Casualty Co., 668 F. Supp.
394, 401 (D.N.J. 1987) (interpreting New Jersey law) (Occurrence clause excludes
coverage where policyholder knew or should have known of ongoing pollution.);
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is excluded if the policyholder knew or should have known
there was a "substantial probability" that the contamination in-
jury in question would result from the policyholder's ac-
tions.'l 6 The injury is considered substantially probable when
indications are strong enough to forewarn a "reasonably pru-
dent person" that the injury is "highly likely" to occur.'17
Other courts require a higher degree of certainty, ruling that
the policyholder must have intended the injury, or must have
known that the injury would flow directly and imminently from
its intentional act, and nevertheless acted with the purpose of
causing the injury.'t 8  These courts recognize that a lesser
standard could frustrate the purpose of liability insurance.
One court explained:
[T]o exclude all losses or damages which might in some way
American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Neville Chem. Co., 650 F. Supp. 929, 932 (W.D. Pa.
1987) (interpreting Pennsylvania law) ("Expected" denotes the actor knew or should
have known there was a substantial probability that certain consequences would re-
sult from his actions.); County of Broome v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 540 N.Y.S.2d
620, 622 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (Damage expected if "the actor knew or should have
known there was a substantial probability that a certain result would take place.").
See also New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Hecla Mining Co., 791 P.2d 1154, 1156 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1989) ("[O]rdinary consequences" of intentional acts are not unexpected.), cert.
granted, (WESTLAW, Allstates May 29, 1990).
186. See City of Carter Lake, 604 F.2d at 1058-59; Township of Gloucester, 668 F. Supp.
at 401; Neville Chem. Co., 650 F. Supp. at 932.
187. See City of Carter Lake, 604 F.2d at 1059 n.4.
188. See City ofJohnstown v. Bankers Standard Ins. Co., 877 F.2d 1146, 1150 (2d
Cir. 1989) (interpreting New York law) (Recovery barred only if policyholder in-
dended damage or knew damage would flow "directly and immediately" from inten-
tional act.); In re Asbestos Ins. Coverage Cases, Judicial Council Coordination
Proceeding No. 1072, Phase III Statement of Decision at 69-70 (Cal. Super. Ct., San
Francisco County filed Jan. 24, 1990) ("Expected or intended" clause applies only
where policyholder acted "either wilfully, intentionally or maliciously for the purpose
of causing injury."); Hecla Mining Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., No. 89SC646, slip
op. at 12 (Colo. filed May 13, 1991) ("Expected or intended" phrase excludes only
those damages that policyholder knew would flow directly and immediately from its
intentional act.); Upjohn Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 444 N.W.2d 813, 817
(Mich. Ct. App. 1989) (Expected or intended injury must be a "natural, foreseeable,
expected, and anticipatory result of an intentional act."); State Farm Fire & Casualty
Co. v. Muth, 207 N.W.2d 364, 366 (Neb. 1973) ("Expected" means high degree of
certainty or probability, practically equated with "intended," and does not substan-
tially enlarge exclusion.); Continental Ins. Co. v. Colangione, 484 N.Y.S.2d 929, 931
(1985) (Calculated risk does not amount to expected damage.); A-I Sandblasting &
Steamcleaning Co., Inc. v. Baiden, 53 Or. App. 890, 897, 632 P.2d 1377, 1381 (1981)
(Coverage not excluded where policyholder did not act for purpose of inflicting the
damage for which it seeks recover under policy.). Cf McGroarty v. Great Am. Ins.




William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 4 [1991], Art. 1
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol17/iss4/1
INSURANCE COVERAGE
have been expected by the insured, could expand the field of
exclusion until virtually no recovery could be had on insur-
ance. This is so since it is mishaps that are "expected"-
taken in its broadest sense-that are insured against.'8 9
Several courts also emphasize that the "occurrence" defini-
tion expressly provides that the expectation of the injury in
question must be evaluated "from the standpoint of the in-
sured.' 190 Accordingly, these courts decline to apply an objec-
tive standard and evaluate coverage based on the
policyholder's actual knowledge, purpose, expectations or
intent. 191
Decisions applying a "virtual certainty" standard are consis-
tent with the plain meaning of "expected or intended," as well
as the insurance industry's historical understanding of that
clause. One dictionary, for example, defines "expect" as "to
look forward to the probable occurrence or appearance of, to
consider likely or certain. '"'92 Consistent with this common
definition, in 1966 a representative of The Hartford Insurance
Group, echoing the understanding of other carriers, assured a
major insurance broker that "expected" means "expected for a
certainty." 9 3
189. City of Johnstown, 877 F.2d at 1150 (emphasis in original),
190. See, e.g., CPS Chem. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 199 N.J. Super. 558, 564,
489 A.2d 1265, 1268 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984) (Unexpected character of acci-
dent is viewed from standpoint of policyholder.), rev'd on other grounds, 203 N.J. Super.
15, 495 A.2d 886 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985); Marotta Scientific Controls, Inc. v.
RLI Ins. Co., No. 87-4438 (D.N.J. June 5, 1990) Ins. Lit. Rep. (Mealey's) Fl, F12
(June 26, 1990) (interpreting New Jersey law) (Policy states that question of whether
property damage is expected or intended is viewed "from the standpoint of the
insured.").
191. Benedictine Sisters of St. Mary's Hosp. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 815
F.2d 1209, 1211 (8th Cir. 1987) (interpreting South Dakota law) (Property damage
resulting from continuing condition is accidental where policyholder was unaware of
the dangerous condition and took good faith steps to remedy the situation after the
initial occurrence.); CPS Chem. Co., 199 N.J. Super. at 564, 489 A.2d at 1269 ("The
intentional acts of a third party. .. [may be] unforeseen, unexpected, and unintended
by the insured."); Marotta Scientific Controls, Inc., No. 87- 4438 (D.N.J. June 5, 1990)
(reprinted in Mealey's Insurance Litigation Reports Fl, F13 (June 26, 1990)) (Testi-
mony demonstrated spills were not "routine, intended, predictable or egregious.");
Du-Wel Prod., Inc. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., No. A-4457-87T2 (N.J. Super. App.
Div. Oct. 26, 1989) (reprinted in Mealey's Insurance Litigation Reports Cl, C7 (Dec.
28, 1989)), (interpreting Michigan law) (Long-term, repeated polluting activity and
policyholder's intentional generation of hazardous waste are not determinative, so
long as policyholder reasonably believed "treated waste was being handled in a way
which would not cause property damage.").
192. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 461 (rev. ed. 1976).
193. Letter from H. Schaffner, The Hartford Insurance Group, to R. Bauer, John-
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The subjective "virtual certainty" standard also comports
with the aleatory nature of insurance contracts. An aleatory
contract is an agreement conditioned on the occurrence of a
fortuitous event "or an event supposed by the parties to be
fortuitous."' 94 The Second Restatement of Contracts defines
an aleatory contract as one in which
at least one party is under a duty that is conditional on the
occurrence of an event that, so far as the parties to the con-
tract are aware, is dependent on chance. Its occurrence may
be within the control of third persons or beyond the control
of any person. The event may have already occurred, as
long as that fact is unknown to the parties. It may be the
failure of something to happen as well as its happening.
Common examples are contracts of insurance and surety-
ship, as well as gambling contracts. 9 '
The CGL carrier's aleatory promise is that it will pay the pol-
icyholder's liabilities for third-party injury or damage neither
expected nor intended by the policyholder. Whether the in-
jury or damage was "substantially probable" and whether a
reasonably prudent person would have expected the injury or
damage should be irrelevant as a matter of contract law. As
long as the policyholder is not certain that injury or damage
will occur, fortuity exists. As long as there is any chance, risk
or probability that injury or damage might not occur, fortuity
exists. The essence of the aleatory insuring agreement is a
"bet" that third-party injury or damage will not occur. If the
policyholder does not act with the purpose of causing the
third-party injury or damage, the bet should be enforced.' 96
In Auto-Owners Insurance Co. v. Jensen,'97 the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals ruled that Minnesota courts would likely
adopt a "substantial probability" standard to evaluate whether
coverage would be excluded by the "expected or intended"
son & Higgins, (Aug. 25, 1966) (discussing New Comprehensive General Liability
Policy) (available in William Mitchell Law Review office). For a discussion of the draft-
ing.history of the "expected or intended" clause, see Pasich & eaza, The Exclusion for
Damage "Expected or Intended" by the Insured: It's Not What the Insurance Industry Would
Have You Believe, 5 Mealey's Litigation Rep.-Ins. 19, 23-25 (April 16, 1991); Heintz,
Gallozzi & Gillis, supra note 193, at 380-83.
194. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 291 (1932).
195. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 379 comment a (1981).
196. See Snapp v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 206 Cal. App. 2d 827, 830, 24
Cal. Rptr. 44, 45-46 (1962).
197. 667 F.2d 714 (8th Cir. 1981).
[Vol. 17
46
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 4 [1991], Art. 1
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol17/iss4/1
INSURANCE COVERAGE
clause.' 98 The parties in Jensen stipulated that the standard
should be an objective one based on whether a reasonable per-
son in the insured's position would have expected the damage
to occur.' 99 Thus, the Eighth Circuit incorporated this objec-
tive test into its "substantial probability" standard. 200 The
Eighth Circuit ruled that damages are "expected or intended"
under Minnesota law if indications are strong enough for a
prudent person to conclude that the damage is "highly likely to
occur."201
The Eighth Circuit's decision inJensen contradicts decisions
of the Minnesota appellate courts. The Minnesota Supreme
Court has expressed concern that the "expected or intended"
clause not be allowed to frustrate the purpose of liability insur-
ance.20 2 In Continental Western Insurance Co. v. Toal,20 the court
held that an "expected injury" cannot be equated with a "fore-
seeable" injury.2° The court reasoned that, otherwise, cover-
age would be unduly limited "since foreseeability is generally
an essential element in establishing liability. ' 20 5 The Toal
court was concerned that the misuse of the "expected or in-
tended" clause might defeat the very purpose for which liabil-
ity insurance is purchased. 0 6 The court noted that other
courts have interpreted the term "expected" to require that a
policyholder act with a "high degree of certainty."2 °7
Thus, theJensen "substantial probability" test does not meet
the Minnesota Supreme Court's requirements. In effect, the
Jensen test permits a carrier to pursue, through discovery and
trial, what amounts to a negligence case against its policy-
holder. Rejecting this tactic, the Minnesota Supreme Court
has adopted a more stringent test requiring a higher degree of
"certainty." Further, Minnesota appellate court decisions ap-
198. Id. at 720.
199. Id. at 717 n.2.
200. Id. at 720.
201. Id.
202. See Continental W. Ins. Co. v. Toal, 309 Minn. 169, 244 N.W.2d 121 (1976).
203. Id.
204. Id. at 176, 244 N.W.2d at 125.
205. ld.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 176 n.3, 244 N.W.2d at 125 n.3 (emphasis added). Significantly, in
support of this proposition the Minnesota Supreme Court cited State Farm Fire &
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plying the "expected or intended" clause have focused on the
actual knowledge of the policyholder in question.2 °s Accord-
ingly, if directly confronted with the issue, Minnesota courts
would likely adopt a subjective standard consistent with the
phrase "from the standpoint of the insured."
E. Defend Any Suit
The standard CGL policy obligates the carrier to defend any
suit against the policyholder seeking damages on account of
bodily injury or property damage to which the policy ap-
plies. 2°9 The duty to defend is triggered by the allegations of
the claim made against the policyholder.2 t0 If any part of the
allegations arguably falls within the scope of coverage, the
duty to defend is triggered t.2 1  Any doubts as to coverage must
be resolved in favor of the policyholder.2 t2 Thus, a CGL car-
rier's duty to defend is considered broader than its duty to
indemnify. 2'3
Typically a governmental agency's first formal claim of liabil-
ity for environmental contamination is made in correspon-
dence identifying a person or entity as a potentially
responsible party (PRP).2t4 The PRP letter usually "requests,"
under the threat of subsequent legal proceedings, that the
party provide information as to its involvement at the site in
question, and cooperate in an investigation of the nature and
extent of contamination. At some point in the investigation,
the agency may also issue a Request for Response Action
208. See, e.g., Farmers Union Oil Co. v. Mutual Serv. Ins. Co., 422 N.W.2d 530,
533 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (Insured actually knew of substantial risks involved.);
Johnson v. AID Ins. Co., 287 N.W.2d 663, 665 (Minn. 1980) (Insured contractor
willfully and knowingly violated contract specifications.); Toal, 309 Minn. at 177, 244
N.W.2d at 126 (Insureds intentionally prepared themselves to inflict serious injury to
facilitate the armed robbery.); Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Bartlett, 307 Minn. 72,
78, 240 N.W.2d 310, 313 (1976) (Insured acted intentionally to consciously control
risks covered by policy.), overruled on other grounds, Prahm v. Rupp Constr. Co., 277
N.W.2d 389 (Minn. 1979).
209. See, e.g., Appendix D-1973 Policy.
210. See, e.g., Economy Fire & Casualty Co. v. Iverson, 445 N.W.2d 824, 826
(Minn. 1989).
211. See, e.g., Jostens, Inc. v. Mission Ins. Co., 387 N.W.2d 161, 165-66 (Minn.
1986); Prahm, 277 N.W.2d at 390.
212. See, e.g., Crum v. Anchor Casualty Co., 264 Minn. 378, 390, 119 N.W.2d 703,
711 (1963).
213. See, e.g., Brown v. State Auto. & Casualty Underwriters, 293 N.W.2d 822, 825
(Minn. 1980).
214. MINN. STAT. § 115B.03 (1990).
[Vol. 17
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(RFRA) letter, which demands that the party continue its inves-
tigation and submit a response plan to remedy the contamina-
tion.2 5 The RFRA letter typically advises that the party's
failure to cooperate will result in the agency implementing a
response plan of the agency's choosing, after which the agency
will commence a court action against the party to recover its
costs.
2 16
The allegations in the typical PRP and RFRA letters argua-
bly fall within the scope of standard CGL insurance coverage
because the allegations claim that the policyholder is legally
liable for third-party property damage. Further, the letters
typically do not include allegations which might raise questions
as to coverage (e.g., that the party expected or intended the
property damage or that the contamination began on a certain
date).2 17 Thus, resolving all doubts in favor of coverage, the
allegations in the PRP and RFRA letters should trigger the car-
rier's duty to defend.
The costs of defending against and investigating the allega-
tions in PRP and RFRA letters can be quite significant. Typical
expenditures might include the costs of numerous monitoring
wells and soil borings, as well as engineer and hydrologist fees,
which are usually necessary to determine the nature and extent
of the policyholder's liabilities. Added to these costs can be
the fees, including attorney's fees, expended in formulating
and negotiating a remedial plan that the government agency
might accept in settlement of its claims.
Further, the CGL carrier's obligation to pay these defense
costs may, in some circumtances, be unlimited. The standard
form CGL policies, prior to the 1986 revision, obligate the car-
rier to continue paying defense costs until indemnity payments
exhaust the policy limits. 2 8 Thus, CGL carriers with low cov-
erage limits conceivably could end up paying defense costs far
above the limits of the policy.
Carriers have attempted to side-step this result by arguing
that the CGL insuring agreement requires them to defend only
"suits," and that PRP and RFRA letters do not constitute
215. Id. § 115B.17, subd. l(a)(1) and subd. 3.
216. Id. § 115B.17, subd. 2.
217. See Avondale Indus., Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 887 F.2d 1200, 1202 (2d
Cir. 1989) (describing agency demand letters received by policyholder).
218. For standard CGL policies prior to the 1986 revision, see Appendices A-D.
19911
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"suits." Some courts agree with this position, reasoning that
the term "suit," although undefined in the policy, plainly re-
fers to formal legal proceedings, such as civil litigation or for-
mal administrative adjudications, and not to informal
proceedings by government agencies. 1 9
Other courts, however, conclude that the term "suit" en-
compasses any effort by a claimant to impose liability on a poli-
cyholder that is ultimately enforceable by a court.220
Generally, these courts focus on the adversarial and coercive
nature of PRP and RFRA letters, and the adverse conse-
quences that may befall a policyholder who does not promptly
and adequately defend against the allegations in those let-
ters.22 ' One court explained that defending the policyholder
219. See Harter Corp. v. Home Indem. Co., 713 F. Supp. 231, 233 (W.D. Mich.
1989) (" '[S]uit' in this context plainly means some type of court proceeding.");
Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Gulf Resources & Chem. Corp., 709 F. Supp. 958, 960
(D. Idaho 1989) (no "suit" where no civil complaint filed); Detrex Chem. Indus. v.
Employers Ins. of Wausau, 681 F. Supp. 438, 442- 43 (N.D. Ohio 1987) (interpreting
Michigan law) (PRP letter is not "suit," but commencement of administrative action
is.), motion for reconsideration overruled, 746 F. Supp. 1310, 1315-17 (N.D. Ohio 1990).
220. See Ryan v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 916 F.2d 731, 741 (1st Cir. 1990) (inter-
preting New York law) (Duty to defend arises when government assumes adversarial
posture, making clear that its force "will be brought promptly to bear in a way that
threatens the insured with probable and imminent financial consequences.");
Avondale Indus., Inc., 887 F.2d at 1206 (adopting a broad construction of the word
"suit" to include administrative proceedings); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Continental
Casualty Co., 771 F.2d 579, 586 (1st Cir. 1985) (interpreting Massachusetts law)
(Pre-complaint defense costs are recoverable where defense activities would have
been performed after complaint, which was almost certain to be filed, and policy-
holder had little choice but to retain counsel and prepare defense.); Higgins Indus.,
Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 730 F. Supp. 774, 776 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (Until facts
establish that insurance policy in question does not apply, insurance companies must
defend governmental claims and demands.); Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos. v. Ex-Cell-O
Corp., 685 F. Supp. 621, 628 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (Federal agency actions against poli-
cyholders are suits because the action is an effort to ultimately impose liability en-
forceable by the court.); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Specialty Coatings Co.,
180 Ill. App. 3d 378, 389, 535 N.E.2d 1071, 1078-79 (1989) (Letter from EPA notify-
ing policyholder of potential liability for cleaning up hazardous waste constitutes
"suit."); Hazen Paper Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 407 Mass. 689, 696,
555 N.E.2d 576, 581 (1990) (Consequences of receiving EPA demand letter are
"substantially equivalent to the commencement of a lawsuit."); Polkow v. Citizens
Ins. Co. of Am., 180 Mich. App. 651, 657, 447 N.W.2d 853, 856 (1989)
("[A]dministrative mechanisms mandating an environmental investigation and
cleanup, backed by the power to expose the insured to a money judgment in a court
of law, amounts to 'suit.' "); C.D. Spangler Constr. Co. v. Industrial Crankshaft &
Eng'g Co., 326 N.C. 133, 154-55, 388 S.E.2d 557, 569-70 (1990) (State orders to
clean up toxic wastes are "suits.").
221. See, e.g., Avondale Indus., Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 697 F. Supp. 1314,
1321-22 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff'd, 887 F.2d 1200 (2d Cir. 1989).
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only after a court action is commenced effectively "shuts the
barn door after the horses have gotten out":
222
The adverse consequence to the insured occurs when the
government chooses a remedial plan more expensive than
an otherwise acceptable plan. Thus, the need for represen-
tation is greatest before the remedial plan is formulated,
when the government is accepting input from the responsi-
ble parties.
.... Since damages may be determined before the par-
ties arrive in court, the administrative process is part of a
"litigious process" that triggers the obligation to defend.
223
Some courts find that the term "suit" is reasonably subject
to more than one meaning, and therefore must be construed in
favor of the policyholder.224 One dictionary, for example, de-
fines "suit" as "the attempt to gain an end by legal process. '"225
Assuming that PRP and RFRA letters are attempts by govern-
ment agencies to gain an end by legal process, the letters
might reasonably fall within the broad definition of "suit."
A restrictive interpretation of the term "suit" may be incon-
sistent with the principle that the duty to defend is broader
than the duty to indemnify. 226 A potentially responsible party
often avoids court proceedings by negotiating a settlement
agreement or "consent order" with the government agency af-
ter a thorough investigation of the extent of the party's liability
and the appropriate remediation. In most jurisdictions, the
party's CGL carrier would be obligated to indemnify the poli-
cyholder for all sums paid pursuant to the settlement. If the
carrier had no obligation to pay defense and investigation
costs because the agency had not commenced court proceed-
ings, the resulting duty to defend would be narrower than the
duty to indemnify.
A restrictive application of the term "suit" may also contra-
vene public policy, as well as common sense.227 The public
interest favors prompt clean-up of hazardous waste, and a co-
operative, private remedial effort is quicker and less expensive
222. Id. at 1321.
223. Id. at 1321-22.
224. See, e.g., C.D. Spangler Constr. Co., 326 N.C. at 154-55, 388 S.E.2d at 570.
225. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW WORLD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2286 (3d ed.
1971).
226. See C.D. Spangler Constr. Co., 326 N.C. at 153-54, 388 S.E.2d at 569-70.
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than a government sponsored program. 22 8 A restrictive appli-
cation of the term "suit" would provide an incentive for policy-
holders to ignore agency requests and wait for court
proceedings to commence. 2 9 One court concluded that this
result would "sharply escalate" the policyholder's (and the car-
rier's) liabilities and costs. 23 0 In addition, "[f]undamental is-
sues involved in the administrative proceeding will obviously
affect the extent of contribution of the various generators of
the waste."
23 '
The Minnesota Supreme Court has not specifically ad-
dressed the "suit" issue in the context of environmental
claims. However, in Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co. v.
Travelers Indemnity Co. ,2s2 the court did indicate that a CGL car-
rier's duty to defend may not be limited to formal court pro-
ceedings .2 " The court stated that "[t]he issue of coverage
does not depend merely on the form of action taken against
the insured. Surely the legal proceedings commenced by
MPCA against the insureds is equally coercive as a civil judg-
ment against the insured. '23 4 The court also noted that policy-
holders contemplate "greater certainty" when they purchase
CGL policies, and could reasonably anticipate coverage of
"any claim asserted against the insured arising out of property
damage, which requires the expenditure of money .. "235
The court in Minnesota Mining also recognized that "[i]t is obvi-
ously the better public policy to encourage responsible parties
to take immediate action themselves to mitigate and remedy
groundwater contamination rather than await a state operated
cleanup effort at a later date. "236 As noted above, a restrictive
application of the term "suit" could contravene this objective
by encouraging policyholders to ignore the orders of a govern-
ment agency until it commences formal court proceedings.
228. Id.
229. See Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 685 F. Supp. 621, 628 (E.D.
Mich. 1987).
230. See Avondale Indus., Inc., 887 F.2d at 1206.
231. Id.
232. 457 N.W.2d 175 (Minn. 1990).
233. Id. at 183.
234, Id. The MPCA had not served a formal civil complaint against any of the
policyholders in Minnesota Mining. Id. at 177. The MPCA had served RFRA letters on
two of the policyholders. Id.
235. Id. at 179 (emphasis added).
236. Id. at 182.
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Finally, the court in Minnesota Mining also ruled that ambigu-
ities of insurance terms which are undefined in a policy may be
demonstrated by the "sharp division in case authority from
other jurisdictions .. ". ."I" Consistent with this ruling, the
term "suit" is ambiguous under Minnesota law and must be
construed in favor of the policyholder.
In view of the court's reasoning in Minnesota Mining, the duty
to defend under Minnesota law should not turn on whether the
claim against the policyholder is made in a formal court plead-
ing or in a PRP letter. Rather, the term "suit" can reasonably
be interpreted to encompass any claim against the policy-
holder arising out of property damage and requiring the ex-
penditure of defense costs.
IV. PROPERTY INSURANCE COVERAGE
Under certain circumstances, the standard "all risks" prop-
erty insurance policy may cover the costs of cleaning up soil or
water which has been contaminated by property covered under
the policy (e.g., chemical products used in the policyholder's
operations).238 Typically, the terms of the standard "all risks"
policy obligate the property insurer to pay the costs of remov-
ing insured property which has been "lost" and transformed
into "debris" due to a fortuitous or non-excluded cause. Fur-
ther, under many policies, the monetary obligation of the car-
rier might extend up to the blanket limit of coverage for
property loss, and beyond the limit at a set amount for each
occurrence.
For example, where a negligent act causes an insured batch
of chemical solvent used in the policyholder's operations to be
lost into the soil, the property insurance carrier may be obli-
gated to pay for the removal of insured "property-turned-deb-
ris" from the soil and groundwater. Depending on the terms
237. Id. at 180.
238. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Protection Mut. Ins. Co., 664 F. Supp.
328, 333 (N.D. Il. 1987) (coverage for expense incurred in clean-up of property
damaged by an insured peril); Manduca Datsun, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Ins.
Co., 106 Idaho 163, 168, 676 P.2d 1274, 1279 (1984) (Recovery granted for any
asphalt damage which may have occurred during clean-up of debris from fire.); Lex-
ington Ins. Co. v. Ryder Sys., Inc., 142 Ga. App. 36, 36, 234 S.E.2d 839, 839-40
(1977) (coverage for costs of removing insured's escaped oil which leaked from stor-
age tanks and contaminated soil).
1991]
53
Mielenhausen: Insurance Coverage for Environmental and Toxic Tort Claims
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1991
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
of the policy, the carrier may be obligated to pay all or a sub-
stantial portion of the clean-up costs.
The carrier's agreement to cover clean-up costs in this type
of situation is expressed in the debris removal clause of the
standard property insurance policy. The agreement in the
1977 standard Special Multi-Peril policy, for example, states:
Debris Removal. This policy covers expense incurred in the
removal of debris of the property covered which may be oc-
casioned by loss by any of the perils insured against in this
policy. The total amount recoverable under this policy for
both loss to property and debris removal expense shall not
exceed the limit of liability applying to the property. Cost
of removal of debris shall not be considered in the determi-
nation of actual cash value when applying the Coinsurance
Clause.
23 9
By its terms, the typical debris removal agreement restricts
coverage to debris of insured property which was lost because of
an insured peril. Under the standard blanket policy, insured
property broadly includes any personal property owned by or
in the care of the insured while on or near premises designated
in the policy. Thus, insured property might include the policy-
holder's supply of solvents and other raw materials used in its
operations, its inventory of finished products, and possibly by-
products of the policyholder's operation if they have some re-
covery value.
The scope of insured perils is also comprehensive. The
standard "all risks" policy covers all risks of direct physical loss
not specifically excluded in the policy. The policy normally
covers any and all fortuitous losses not resulting solely from an
excluded cause of loss or from fraudulent acts of the policy-
holder.24 ° Many courts have determined that a loss is fortui-
tous, and thus covered, if it results from the acts or omissions
of third parties or from the negligence of the policyholder or
its employees. 24' Neither of these causes of loss is specifically
239. INSURANCE SERVICES OFFICE, Special Multi-Peril Policy Conditions and Definitions,
Form MP 00 90, July 1977, at 2 (available in William Mitchell Law Review office).
240. See C.H. Leavell & Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 372 F.2d 784, 787 (9th
Cir. 1967); Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. v. Industrial Risk Insurers, 289 Pa. Super. 479,
483-84, 433 A.2d 906, 908 (1981).
241. See Texas E. Transmission Corp. v. Marine Office-Appleton & Cox Corp.,
579 F.2d 561, 565 (10th Cir. 1978) (Negligence of contractor's employees is not ex-
cluded under policy.); Redna Marine Corp. v. Poland, 46 F.R.D. 81, 87 (S.D.N.Y.
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excluded in the standard "all risks" policy, at least prior to
1983.
The standard policy typically excludes loss of covered prop-
erty caused by contamination, deterioration, inherent vice, la-
tent defect, wear and tear, marring or scratching. 242 A number
of courts have interpreted this exclusion to preclude coverage
of lost property merely because the property is in a contami-
nated condition, even though the condition may have resulted
from an external, covered cause of loss.
243
Other courts conclude that the contamination exclusion ap-
plies only when the contaminated condition of the lost prop-
erty arises from the property itself, not when the condition
resulted from an external cause.244 These decisions are consis-
tent with the drafting intent of the contamination exclusion.
One insurance industry publication explained:
Within the context of the exclusion, the drafters of the form
seem to be talking about loss to physical property that will
happen given a sufficient period of time. Physical property
1969) (Negligence of insured, or of employees of insured, which causes fortuitous
loss is within coverage of "all risk" insurance.).
242. INSURANCE SERVICES OFFICE, Special Multi-Peril Policy, Form MP 00 14, Oct.
1983, at 3-4 (available in William Mitchell Law Review office).
243. See American Casualty Co. of Reading, Pennsylvania v. A.L. Myrick, 304 F.2d
179, 184 (5th Cir. 1962) (Goods contaminated by ammonia gas excluded from cover-
age even though cause was external to goods.); Hi-G, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine
Ins. Co., 283 F. Supp. 211, 213 (D. Mass. 1967) (No recovery where "relays" were
contaminated by oil vapor.).
244. See Central Cold Storage v. Lexington Ins. Co., 452 So. 2d 1014, 1015 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1984) ("All risks" policy which insured property against "external"
causes held to extend coverage for damage to stored goods resulting from an ammo-
nia leak where ammonia was external to the goods in storage.). See also Raybestos-
Manhattan, Inc. v. Industrial Risk Insurers, 289 Pa. Super. 479, 484, 433 A.2d 906,
908-09 (1981). In Raybestos-Manhattan, the court held that an "all risk" policy which
insured property against "external" causes extended coverage where the proximate
or direct cause of appellee's loss was the unintentional pouring of fuel oil into a tank
intended for heptane. Because this was a non-excluded, external cause, the court
held that the policy provided coverage even though an external cause brought about
the loss by contaminating the internal contents of the heptane tank. That internal
damage was brought about by an external cause was largely irrelevant, the court said,
since "[i]ndemnity was provided for such a loss to the same extent as if oil had been
poured directly upon the work [itself]." Id. at 909.
In reaching its decision, the Raybestos-Manhattan court relied on Dubuque Fire &
Marine Ins. Co. v. Caylor, 249 F.2d 162 (10th Cir. 1957). In Dubuque, the court stated
it "is concerned with the outward source or origin of an instigating agent. A cause
which has an external source or origin is not rendered internal by the fact that its
effect is internal, since it is the means and not the injury itself to which the phrase
refers." Id. at 165.
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will wear out, it will become mildewed or rotten if subject to
enough humidity for sufficiently long, things mechanical
will break down, latent defects will eventually reveal them-
selves, etc. Losses like these must be distinguished, how-
ever, from the sudden and accidental damage that property
is heir to; set fire to a sofa and it clearly becomes marred,
but just as clearly that is not what the homeowners ... ex-
clusion refers to .... "[Clontamination" is another of those
instances of property damage that, like wear and tear or
marring and scratching, will happen. There is in such in-
stances no risk of loss against which to insure. But such in-
stances are quite unlike accidental damage to carpeting that
may result in its "contamination.-
24 5
Decisions limiting the scope of the contamination exclusion
also are consistent with the "contributing cause" rule gov-
erning standard "all risks" policies. Under this rule, lost prop-
erty is covered where any one of the causes of the loss is not
specifically excluded under the policy, even though an ex-
cluded cause may have also contributed to the loss. 2 46 Thus,
even if contamination was considered to be a cause of the loss
of property, the loss would be covered if it also was caused by a
non-excluded, fortuitous event, such as a negligent act.
In 1983, the insurance industry amended the standard "all
risks" policy, adding a new exclusion pertaining to losses
caused by "acts," omissions and faulty workmanship.24 7 The
exclusion appears to nullify itself, however, by excepting any
"ensuing loss" not specifically excluded in the policy. The ex-
clusion provides:
This policy does not insure against loss caused by any of the
following. However, any ensuing loss not excluded or excepted in
this policy is covered....
(a) Acts or decisions, including the failure to act or decide,
of any person, group, organization or governmental body;
(b) Faulty, inadequate or defective:
245. Questions and Answers: Homeowners Contamination Exclusion, [Personal Lines] Fire
Casualty & Surety Bulls. (The National Underwriter Co.), at 541-42 (Apr. 1983) (em-
phasis in original) (discussing a homeowner's property insurance policy).
246. See, e.g., Henning Nelson Constr. Co. v. Fireman's Fund Am. Life Ins. Co.,
383 N.W.2d 645, 653 (Minn. 1986). See also Texas E. Transmission Corp. v. Marine
Office-Appleton & Cox Corp., 579 F.2d 561, 565 (10th Cir. 1978) ("[I]f there is a
concurrence of negligence and an excluded peril such as an inherent defect, then
coverage applies under an 'all risks' policy.").
247. INSURANCE SERVICES OFFICE, Special Multi-Peril Policy Form MP 00 14, Oct.
1983, at 4 (available in William Mitchell Law Review office).
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planning, zoning, development, surveying, siting;
design, specifications, workmanship, repair, construc-
tion, renovation, remodeling, grading, compaction;
materials used in repair, construction, renovation or re-
modeling; or
maintenance of part or all of any property on or off the
described premises.24
At least one court, in examining a similar exclusion, has noted
that the "ensuing loss" exception to this type of exclusion ap-
pears to be "self-contradictory gibberish.
24 9
The Insurance Services Office has attempted to explain the
"ensuing loss" exception as follows:
For these exclusions, any ensuing loss not excluded or ex-
cepted is covered. This means that there is no coverage for
a claim to repair an improperly built window; however,
there is coverage, fpr example, if a fire or other covered
cause of loss ensues from improperly placed electrical wir-
ing or the act of carelessly smoking in bed.2 5°
This analysis may be effective in the context of the standard
"named peril" policy, which limits coverage to a definite list of
specifically described causes of loss (such as fire). The stan-
dard "all risks" policy, however, covers any and all fortuitous
causes of loss which are not specifically excluded.
In many instances, property losses directly ensue from fortu-
itous events caused by acts, omissions or faulty workmanship.
For example, the loss of insured solvents from an under-
ground storage tank might ensue from the fortuitous release of
the solvents from the tank, which in turn ensued from the for-
tuitous rupture of the tank, which in turn was caused by faulty
workmanship in manufacturing the tank walls, or the negligent
act of sideswiping the tank with a bulldozer during excavation.
In this situation, under the "ensuing loss" exception and the
"contributing cause" rule, the policy should cover the loss of
solvents, as well as the cost of removing this covered-property-
turned-debris from the soil.
In 1986 the insurance industry changed the standard "all
248. Id. (emphasis added).
249. Lake Charles Harbor & Terminal Dist. v. Imperial Casualty Indem. Co., 857
F.2d 286, 288 (5th Cir. 1988).
250. MALLIN, POLLUTION AND CONTAMINATION: How WILL PROPERTY INSURERS RE-
SPOND? 88 (ABA monograph 1989) (quoting INSURANCE SERVICES OFFICE CIRCULAR,
CALIFORNIA EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 2 (Aug. 9, 1983)) k'available in William Mitch-
ell Law Review office).
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risks" policy to exclude coverage of any loss caused by the re-
lease of "pollutants," unless the release was caused by one of
fifteen specified causes of loss. 25' In effect, the insurance in-
dustry converted "all risks" coverage to "named peril" cover-
age with respect to contamination-related property loss. The
debris removal agreement also was changed to exclude cover-
age for extracting pollutants from land or water, and remov-
ing, restoring or replacing polluted land or water. 52
Depending on the circumstances of a case, these provisions
may limit or defeat coverage for cleaning up covered-property-
turned-debris due to a post-1986 loss.
Cases interpreting pre-1986 "all risks" policies indicate that
Minnesota courts would enforce the debris removal agreement
and require the carrier to pay the cost of cleaning up covered
property lost into soil or water because of any non-excluded
fortuitous cause. In Pillsbury Co. v. Underwriters at Lloyds,
London, 53 the United States District Court for the District of
Minnesota ruled that "[t]he insured's burden under an all risks
policy is limited. The insured need only show that a loss oc-
curred and that the loss was fortuitous. ' 254 Further, "[t]he in-
sured is not required to prove the precise cause of the loss or
damage or to demonstrate that it was occasioned by an exter-
nal cause."' 255 The court in Pillsbury also held that a loss may
be fortuitous and covered "[e]ven if the loss resulted from the
policyholder's negligence.' '256 In Wyatt v. Northwestern Mutual
Insurance Co. of Seattle,257 the federal district court found that
the negligent acts of third parties similarly constituted a fortui-
tous and covered cause of loss under an "all risks" policy.2 58
Under Minnesota law, the contamination exclusion should
not defeat debris removal coverage where any fortuitous cause
(such as negligence) contributes to the loss. The Minnesota
Supreme Court, in Henning Nelson Construction Co. v. Fireman's
251. Id. at 95-108.
252. Id.
253. 705 F. Supp. 1396 (D. Minn. 1989).
254. Id. at 1399.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 1400.
257. 304 F. Supp. 781 (D. Minn. 1969).
258. Id. at 783. See also Hogs Unlimited v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 401 N.W.2d
381, 386 (Minn. 1987) (Innocent insured partner's loss covered when caused by for-
tuitous, intentional act of coinsured.).
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Fund American Life Insurance Co. ,259 ruled that the "all risks" pol-
icy covers a loss when any one of the contributing causes of the
loss is not specifically excluded under the policy, even though
an excluded cause may have contributed to the loss.
260
In Twin City Hide v. Transamerica Insurance Co. ,261 the Minne-
sota Court of Appeals indicated that property in a rotted con-
dition might be excluded merely because of the condition,
regardless of whether the condition resulted from external
causes.2 62 This decision, however, may be inconsistent with
the drafting intent of the contamination and deterioration ex-
clusion, as well as with the "contributing cause" rule.263 The
court of appeals' decision in Twin City Hide might have been
influenced by compelling evidence refuting the policyholder's
assertion that the rotted condition of the property resulted
from the alleged external cause.26
It is likely that, in many circumstances, Minnesota law also
would limit applicability of the 1983 acts, omissions, and faulty
workmanship exclusion. In Pillsbury, the court ruled that a
faulty workmanship exclusion "applies only to the losses re-
lated to 'making good' the defect and not to losses caused by
the defect.1265 Thus, the policy might not cover the cost of
replacing a storage tank which ruptures due to faulty work-
manship. The ensuing loss of insured solvents from the tank,
however, would fall outside the faulty workmanship exclusion.
Further, consistent with the "contributing cause" rule, the
Minnesota Supreme Court, in Caledonia Community Hospital v.
Saint Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co.,266 determined that an
"ensuing loss" exception includes any covered cause contrib-
uting to the loss of property, even if the covered cause flowed
259. 383 N.W.2d 645 (Minn. 1986).
260. Id. at 653.
261. 358 N.W.2d 90 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
262. Id. at 92.
263. See Campbell v. Insurance Serv. Agency, 424 N.W.2d 785, 789 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1988) (applying "contributing cause" rule).
264. Twin City Hide, 358 N.W.2d at 92.
265. Pillsbury Co. v. Underwriters at Lloyds, London, 705 F. Supp. 1396, 1400-01
(D. Minn. 1989). The court in Pil/sbury did not clarify whether it was ruling on this
issue as a matter of Minnesota law. See id. The Eighth Circuit, however, has indicated
that the phrase "external cause" in an "all risks" insurance agreement excludes cov-
erage of losses resulting from negligence of a policyholder. See N-Ren Corp. v.
American Home Assurance Co., 619 F.2d 784, 787-88 (8th Cir. 1980) (interpreting
Minnesota law).
266. 239 N.W.2d 768 (Minn. 1976).
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directly from the excluded cause of loss.267
V. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPAIRMENT LIABILITY INSURANCE
COVERAGE
In the early 1980s, the insurance industry began to offer a
new type of coverage for environmental claims, often referred
to as environmental impairment liability (EIL) insurance. The
EIL market has been volatile over the past decade. By 1983,
the EIL market reached a peak with over fifty insurance compa-
nies or risk retention groups offering various types of EIL cov-
erage. Thereafter, the market rapidly declined to a point
where only a handful of carriers offered EIL coverage.
Recently, however, carriers have been reentering the mar-
ket. EIL coverage for underground storage tanks, in particu-
lar, is increasingly available from a variety of sources.
Financial responsibility laws pertaining to tanks have strength-
ened the demand for this coverage. Also, carriers are finding
that the risks associated with storage tanks are relatively pre-
dictable and avoidable.
The terms of EIL coverage can differ significantly from pol-
icy to policy, although standard features are typically included
in most policies. Generally, EIL policies cover claims for dam-
ages and clean-up costs incurred because of contamination-re-
lated injury or damage occurring away from the policyholder's
premises (as designated in the policy declarations) due to con-
ditions at the designated premises. Some policies allow off-
premises waste sites to be included in the list of designated
premises. Costs of cleaning-up the policyholder's own or des-
ignated premises typically are not covered.
268
For a number of reasons, EIL policies may afford nominal
protection even for the limited risks covered. Many policies
broadly exclude damages and costs associated with govern-
mental requests for clean up or other response action. This
exclusion might be asserted to avoid reimbursement for off-
premises damages or clean-up costs that would otherwise fall
within coverage, simply because of government involvement or
intervention.
Most policies also exclude coverage of pre-existing condi-
267. Id. at 770.
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tions which the policyholder knew or should have known prior
to the issuance of the policy. EIL carriers frequently have at-
tempted to defeat coverage by alleging that the policyholder
should have foreseen the environmental impairment in ques-
tion. In effect, the EIL insurer pursues a negligence claim (and
sometimes an intentional tort claim) against its policyholder in
order to avoid coverage. This practice eases the task of toxic
tort plaintiffs who might be waiting in the wings.
Further, EIL policies invariably are written for one year at a
time on a claims-made basis. This means that, when environ-
mental impairment occurs during that year (or during the
specified retroactive period), there is no coverage unless
claims arising from the impairment are made within the annual
policy period. In a situation where environmental impairment
does not result in immediate claims, the carrier may invoke the
cancellation or renegotiation provisions of the policy. Gener-
ally, these provisions allow the carrier to terminate or renego-
tiate coverage on short notice and before the end of the policy
period.
Typically, the carrier's cancellation in this situation is subject
to an "extended discovery" clause. This provision entitles the
policyholder to purchase "tail" insurance covering a specified
period after cancellation or expiration of the policy. Claims
arising from impairment during the original policy period but
made during the "extended discovery" period would therefore
be covered, regardless of the carrier's cancellation.
As a practical matter, however, a tight EIL market may force
the policyholder to renegotiate the policy when an environ-
mental impairment occurs. Under the threat of cancellation,
and the possibility of finding no replacement coverage, the
policyholder may feel compelled to agree to an endorsement
excluding any claims arising from the environmental impair-
ment at issue. Thus, by purchasing EIL coverage in a tight
market the policyholder may have purchased, in effect, no
more than one bite of the apple. When environmental impair-
ment occurs, the policyholder must decide whether potential
claims that might arise from the incident justify taking that one
bite.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that, in many jurisdic-
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tions, the insurance industry is facing enormous financial obli-
gations for liabilities arising from environmental and toxic tort
claims. While many carriers have so far avoided their obliga-
tions through protracted litigation, others have proposed con-
structive and far-sighted alternatives.
Under one proposal, for example, primary and excess insur-
ers of past waste generators, as well as the carriers' reinsurers,
would contribute to a fund, administered by the United States
Environmental Protection Agency, for clean-up of waste sites
and settlement of private claims. 269 For these carriers, the cre-
ation of an Insurance Superfund might be more economical
than engaging in expensive, acrimonious and unpredictable
coverage litigation with their valued customers, and ultimately
with each other. To date the insurance industry has not
pushed for this type of group approach to meeting its obliga-
tions. In the meantime, the litigation continues.
269. Thomas, supra note 1; see also Gastel, Environmental Pollution: Insurance Issues,
INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, Mar. 1990 (LEXIS, NEXIS).
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The following provisions from the Insurance Services Office's
1941 standard policy are relevant to the discussion in this
article:
[The carrier agrees:]
I. COVERAGE A-BODILY INJURY LIABILITY
To pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the in-
sured shall become obligated to pay by reason of the liabil-
ity imposed upon him by law, or assumed by him under
contract as defined herein, for damages, including damages
for care and loss of services, because of bodily injury, sick-
ness or disease, including death at any time resulting there-
from, sustained by any person or persons and caused by the
accident.
COVERAGE C-PROPERTY DAMAGE LIABILITY-EX-
CEPT AUTOMOBILES
To pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the in-
sured shall become obligated to pay by reason of the liabil-
ity imposed upon him by law, or assumed by him under
contract as defined herein, for damages because of injury to
or destruction of property, including the loss of use thereof,
caused by accident.
II. DEFENSE, SETTLEMENT, SUPPLEMENTARY
PAYMENTS
As respects such insurance as is afforded by the other
terms of this policy the company shall
(a) defend in his name and behalf any suit against the
insured alleging such injury, sickness, disease or de-
struction and seeking damages on account thereof,
even if such suit is groundless, false, or fraudulent;
but the company shall have the right to make such
investigation, negotiation and settlement of any
claim or suit as may be deemed expedient by the
company[.]
EXCLUSIONS
This policy does not apply:
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(f) under coverage C, to injury to or destruction of (1)
property owned, occupied or used by or rented to
the insured, or except with respect to liability as-
sumed under sidetrack agreements and the use of el-
evators or escalators, property in the care, custody or
control of the insured, or (2) any goods or products
manufactured, sold, handled or distributed or prem-
ises alienated by the named insured, or work com-
pleted by or for the named insured, out of which the
accident arises.
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The following provisions from the Insurance Services Office's




Coverage A - Bodily Injury Liability
To pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured
shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of
bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death at any
time resulting therefrom, sustained by any person and
caused by accident.
Coverage B - Property Damage Liability
To pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured
shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of
injury to or destruction of property, including the loss of
use thereof, caused by accident.
Defense, Settlement, Supplementary Payments
With respect to such insurance as is afforded by this policy,
the company shall:
(a) defend any suit against the insured alleging such injury,
sickness, disease or destruction and seeking damages on
account thereof, even if such suit is groundless, false or
fraudulent; but the company may make such investiga-
tion, negotiation and settlement of any claim or suit as it
deems expedient[.]
EXCLUSIONS
This policy does not apply:
(h) under coverage B, to injury to or destruction of (1)
property owned or occupied by or rented to the in-
sured, or (2) except with respect to liability under side-
track agreements covered by this policy, property used
by the insured, or (3) except with respect to liability
under such sidetrack agreements or the use of elevators
or escalators on premises owned by, rented to or con-
trolled by the named insured, property in the care, cus-
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tody or control of the insured or property as to which
the insured for any purpose is exercising physical con-
trol, or any goods, products or containers thereof man-
ufactured, sold, handled or distributed or premises
alienated by the named insured, or work completed by
or for the named insured, out of which the accident
arises[.]
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The following provisions from the Insurance Services Office's
1966 standard policy are relevant to the discussion in this
article:
COVERAGE A - BODILY INJURY LIABILITY
COVERAGE B - PROPERTY DAMAGE LIABILITY
The company will pay on behalf of the insured all sums
which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as
damages because of
A. bodily injury, or
B. property damage
to which this insurance applies, caused by an occurrence,
and the company shall have the right and duty to defend
any suit against the insured seeking damages on account of
such bodily injury or property damage, even if any of the
allegations of the suit are groundless, false or fraudulent,
and may make such investigation and settlement of any
claim or suit as it deems expedient, but the company shall
not be obligated to pay any claim or judgment or to defend
any suit after the applicable limit of the company's liability
has been exhausted by payment of judgments or
settlements.
EXCLUSIONS
This insurance does not apply:
(i) to property damage to
(1) property owned or occupied by or rented to the
insured,
(2) property used by the insured, or
(3) property in the care, custody or control of the in-
sured or as to which the insured is for any purpose
exercising physical control;
but parts (2) and (3) of this exclusion do not apply with
respect to liability under a written sidetrack agreement
and part (3) of this exclusion does not apply with respect
to property damage (other than to elevators) arising out
of the use of an elevator at premises owned by, rented to
or controlled by the named insured;
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(j) to property damage to premises alienated by the named
insured arising out of such premises or any part
thereofi.]
DEFINITIONS
When used in this policy (including endorsements forming
a part hereof):
"bodily injury" means bodily injury, sickness or disease sus-
tained by any person;
"damages" includes damages for death and for care and
loss of services resulting from bodily injury and damages
for loss of use of property resulting from property damage;
"occurrence" means an accident, including injurious expo-
sure to conditions, which results, during the policy period,
in bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor
intended from the standpoint of the insured[.]
[Vol. 17
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The following provisions from the Insurance Services Office's
1973 standard policy are relevant to the discussion in this
article:
COVERAGE A - BODILY INJURY LIABILITY
COVERAGE B - PROPERTY DAMAGE LIABILITY
The company will pay on behalf of the insured all sums
which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as
damages because of
A. bodily injury, or
B. property damage
to which this insurance applies, caused by an occurrence,
and the company shall have the right and duty to defend
any suit against the insured seeking damages on account of
such bodily injury or property damage, even if any of the
allegations of the suit are groundless, false or fraudulent,
and may make such investigation and settlement of any
claim or suit as it deems expedient, but the company shall
not be obligated to pay any claim or judgment or to defend
any suit after the applicable limit of the company's liability
has been exhausted by payment of judgments or
settlements.
EXCLUSIONS
This insurance does not apply:
(f) to bodily injury or property damage arising out of the
discharge, dispersal, release or escape of smoke, vapors,
soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals, liquids or
gases, waste materials or other irritants, contaminants or
pollutants into or upon land, the atmosphere or any
water course or body of water; but this exclusion does
not apply if such discharge, dispersal, release or escape
is sudden and accidental.
(k) to property damage to
(1) property owned or occupied by or rented to the
insured,
(2) property used by the insured, or
(3) property in the care, custody or control of the in-
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sured or as to which the insured is for any purpose
exercising physical control,
but parts (2) and (3) of this exclusion do not apply with
respect to liability under a written sidetrack agreement
and part (3) of this exclusion does not apply with re-
spect to property damage (other than to elevators) aris-
ing out of the use of an elevator at premises owned by,
rented to or controlled by the named insured;
(1) to property damage to premises alienated by the named
insured arising out of such premises or any part
thereofi.]
DEFINITIONS
When used in this policy (including endorsements forming
a part hereof):
"bodily injury" means bodily injury, sickness or disease sus-
tained by any person which occurs during the policy period,
including death at any time resulting therefrom;
-occurrence" means an accident, including continous or re-
peated exposure to conditions, which results in bodily in-
jury or property damage neither expected nor intended
from the standpoint of the insured;
"property damage" means (1) physical injury to or destruc-
tion of tangible property which occurs during the policy pe-
riod, including the loss of use thereof at any time resulting
therefrom, or (2) loss of use of tangible property which has
not been physically injured or destroyed provided such loss
of use is caused by an occurrence during the policy period.
[Vol. 17
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The following provisions from the Insurances Services Office's
1986 standard "claims-made" policy are relevant to the dis-
cussion in this article:
SECTION 1 - COVERAGES
COVERAGE A - BODILY INJURY AND PROPERTY
DAMAGE LIABILITY
1. Insuring Agreement.
a. We will pay those sums that the insured becomes le-
gally obligated to pay as damages because of "bodily
injury" or "property damage" to which this insur-
ance applies. No other obligation or liability to pay
sums or perform acts or services is covered unless
explicitly provided for under SUPPLEMENTARY
PAYMENTS - COVERAGES A AND B. This insur-
ance does not apply to "bodily injury" or "property
damage" which occurred before the Retroactive
Date, if any, shown in the Declarations or which oc-
curs after the policy period. The "bodily injury" or
"property damage" must be caused by an
"occurrence."
b. This insurance applies to "bodily injury" and "prop-
erty damage" only if a claim for damages because of
the "bodily injury" or "property damage" is first
made against any insured during the policy period.
2. Exclusions.
This insurance does not apply to:
a. "Bodily injury" or "property damage" expected or
intended from the standpoint of the insured. This
exclusion does not apply to "bodily injury" result-
ing from the use of reasonable force to protect per-
sons or property.
f. (1) "Bodily injury" or "property damage" arising
out of the actual, alleged or threatened discharge,
dispersal, release or escape of pollutants:
(a) At or from premises you own, rent or occupy;
(b) At or from any site or location used by or for
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you or others for the handling, storage, dispo-
sal, processing or treatment of waste;
(c) Which are at any time transported, handled,
stored, treated, disposed of, or processed as
waste by or for you or any person or organiza-
tion for whom you may be legally responsible;
or
(d) At or from any site or location on which you or
any contractors or subcontractors working di-
rectly or indirectly on your behalf are perform-
ing operations:
(i) if the pollutants are brought on or to the
site or location in connection with such op-
erations; or
(ii) if the operations are to test for, monitor,
clean up, remove, contain, treat, detoxify or
neutralize the pollutants.
(2) Any loss, cost, or expense arising out of any
governmental direction or request that you test
for, monitor, clean up, remove, contain, treat,
detoxify or neutralize pollutants.
Pollutants means any solid, liquid, gaseous or
thermal irritant or contaminant, including
smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemi-
cals and waste. Waste includes materials to be
recycled, reconditioned or reclaimed.
(j) "Property damage" to:
(1) Property you own, rent, or occupy;
(2) Premises you sell, give away or abandon, if
the "property damage" arises out of any
part of those premises;
(3) Property loaned to you;
(4) Personal property in your care, custody or
control;
(5) That particular part of real property on
which you or any contractors or subcontrac-
tors working directly or indirectly on your
behalf are performing operations, if the
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(6) That particular part of any property that
must be restored, repaired or replaced be-
cause "your work" was incorrectly per-
formed on it.
Paragraph (2) of this exclusion does not apply if the
premises are "your work" and were never occupied,
rented or held for rental by you.
Paragraphs (3), (4), (5), and (6) of this exclusion do
not apply to liability assumed under a sidetrack
agreement.
Paragraph (6) of this exclusion does not apply to
"property damage" included in the "products-com-
pleted operations hazard."
SECTION VI- DEFINITIONS
3. "Bodily injury" means bodily injury, sickness or dis-
ease sustained by a person, including death resulting
from any of these at any time.
9. "Occurrence" means an accident, including continu-
ous or repeated exposure to substantially the same
general harmful conditions.
11. a. "Products-completed operations hazard" includes
all "bodily injury" and "property damage" occur-
ring away from premises you own or rent and aris-
ing out of "your product" or "your work" except:
(1) Products that are still in your physical posses-
sion; or
(2) Work that has not yet been completed or
abandoned.
b. "Your work" will be deemed completed at the ear-
liest of the following times:
(1) When all of the work called for in your con-
tract has been completed.
(2) When all of the work to be done at the site has
been completed if your contract calls for work
at more than one site.
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(3) When that part of the work done at a job site
had been put to its intended use by any person
or organization other than another contractor
or subcontractor working on the same project.
Work that may need service, maintenance, correc-
tion, repair or replacement, but which is otherwise
complete, will be treated as completed.
c. This hazard does not include "bodily injury" or
"property damage" arising out of:
(1) The transportation of property, unless the in-
jury or damage arises out of a condition in or
on a vehicle created by the "loading or un-
loading" of it;
(2) The existence of tools, uninstalled equipment
or abandoned or unused materials;
(3) Products or operations for which the classifica-
tion in this Coverage Part or in our manual of
rules includes products or completed
operations.
12. "Property damage" means:
a. Physical injury to tangible property, includ-
ing all resulting loss of use of that property;
or
b. Loss of use of tangible property that is not
physically injured.
13. "Suit" means a civil proceeding in which dam-
ages because of "bodily injury," "property dam-
age," "personal injury" or "advertising injury"
to which this insurance applies are alleged.
"Suit" includes an arbitration proceeding alleg-
ing such damages to which you must submit or
submit with our consent.
14. "Your product" means:
a. Any goods or products, other than real prop-
erty, manufactured, sold, handled, distrib-
uted or disposed of by:
(1) You;
(2) Others trading under your name; or
[Vol. 17
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(3) A person or organization whose business
or assets you have acquired; and
b. Containers (other than vehicles), materials,
parts or equipment furnished in connection
with such goods or products.
"Your product" includes warranties or rep-
resentations made at any time with respect to
the fitness, quality, durability or performance
of any of the items included in a. and b.
above.
"Your product" does not include vending
machines or other property rented to or lo-
cated for the use of others but not sold.
15. "Your work" means:
a. Work or operations performed by you
or on your behalf; and
b. Materials, parts or equipment furnished
in connection with such work or
operations.
"Your work" includes warranties or repre-
sentations made at any time with respect to
the fitness, quality, durability or perform-
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